Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Esta publicación cientíca en formato digital es continuidad de la revista impresa
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197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.39 N° 71
2021
ISSN 0798-1406 ~ Depósito legal pp 198502ZU132
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca cn aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
Hu ma nas y So cia les, a tra vés de la di vul ga ción de los re sul ta dos lo gra dos por sus in ves-
ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-
ción, dis cu sión ycon fron ta cióndelasideas y avan ces cien tí fi coscon com pro mi soso cial.
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al o y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN
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Re vicyhLUZ, In ter na tio nal Po li ti cal Scien ce Abs tracts, Re vis ta In ter ame ri ca na de
Bi blio gra fía, en el Cen tro La ti no ame ri ca no para el De sa rrol lo (CLAD), en Bi blio-
gra fía So cio Eco nó mi ca de Ve ne zue la de RE DIN SE, In ter na tio nal Bi blio graphy of
Po li ti cal Scien ce, Re vencyt, His pa nic Ame ri can Pe rio di cals In dex/HAPI), Ul ri chs
Pe rio di cals Di rec tory, EBS CO. Se en cuen tra acre di ta da al Re gis tro de Pu bli ca cio-
nes Cien tí fi cas y Tec no ló gi cas Ve ne zo la nas del FO NA CIT, La tin dex.
Di rec to ra
L
OIRALITH
M. C
HIRINOS
P
ORTILLO
Co mi Edi tor
Eduviges Morales Villalobos
Fabiola Tavares Duarte
Ma ría Eu ge nia Soto Hernández
Nila Leal González
Carmen Pérez Baralt
Co mi Ase sor
Pedro Bracho Grand
J. M. Del ga do Ocan do
Jo Ce rra da
Ri car do Com bel las
An gel Lom bar di
Die ter Nohlen
Al fre do Ra mos Ji mé nez
Go ran Ther born
Frie drich Welsch
Asis ten tes Ad mi nis tra ti vos
Joan López Urdaneta y Nilda Man
Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas. Ins ti tu to de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co
Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che. Ma ra cai bo, Ve ne zue la. E- mail: cues tio nes po li ti cas@gmail.
com ~ loi chi ri nos por til lo@gmail.com. Te le fax: 58- 0261- 4127018.
Vol. 39, Nº 71 (2021), 921-941
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Recibido el 14/07/2021 Aceptado el 22/09/2021
Legal procedure in roman law and its
reection in modern civil procedure
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3971.56
Kravtsov Serhij *
Vlasenko Serhii **
Rozhnov Oleh ***
Iryna Malinovska ****
Abstract
Tremendous eorts of legislators are directed towards
the development of an ideal judicial system and procedure of
administering justice. However, current trends of judiciary
reformation are easier to comprehend and accept if we turn to the
origins of legal protection of human rights which, undoubtedly,
go back to the Roman law. Methodology: From this point we
use comparing methods for analizing the legislative provisions;
the structural method and historical method was used for the
background of Legal procedure in roman law. Results and conclusions: In
this article we will outline the main stages of formation of legal protection
of human rights in Roman law and characterize types of these processes –
namely legis actiones, formulary procedure and cognitio. By analyzing the
original sources that have survived to our times, namely the Law of Twelve
Tables, Gaius`s Institutions and Justinian`s Digestes, we will examine what
peculiarities of consideration and resolution of cases each of these stages
demonstrated; how the traditional views on the behavior of the parties and
the court in the process were established; which main requirements were
applied to justice in civil matters in Roman law. In the course of the work
the following methods were used: essential, comparative, general historical.
Keywords: legis actiones, formulary procedure, cognitio.
*PhD in Law, Associate Professor, Department of Civil Procedure, Yaroslav the Wise National Law
University, Ukraine. ORCID ID: hhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8270-193X. Email: s.o.kravtsov@nlu.
edu.ua
** Associate professor of the Department of Legal History, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University.
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/ 0000-0001-7696-6096. Email: s.i.vlasenko@nlu.edu.ua
*** PhD in Law, Assoc. Prof. at Civil Procedure Department Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University
Kharkiv, Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/ 0000-0002-7217-8153. Email: o.v.rozhnov@nlu.edu.
ua
**** PhD. In Law, Assist. Prof. of Civil Law Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University Kharkiv,
Ukraine. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5945-2042. Email: i.malynovska@knute.edu.ua
922
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
Procedimiento legal en derecho romano y su reexión
en el procedimiento civil moderno
Resumen
Los tremendos esfuerzos de los legisladores se dirigen hacia el desarrollo
de un sistema judicial ideal y un procedimiento de administración de justicia.
Sin embargo, las tendencias actuales de reforma judicial son más fáciles de
comprender y aceptar si nos dirigimos a los orígenes de la protección jurídica
de los derechos humanos que, sin duda, se remontan al derecho romano.
Metodología: A partir de este punto utilizamos métodos comparativos para
analizar las disposiciones legislativas; El método estructural y el método
histórico se utilizaron para el trasfondo del procedimiento legal en derecho
romano. Resultados y conclusiones: En este artículo describiremos las
principales etapas de formación de la protección jurídica de los derechos
humanos en el derecho romano y caracterizamos los tipos de estos procesos,
a saber, legis actiones, formulario de procedimiento y cognitio. Analizando
las fuentes originales que han sobrevivido hasta nuestros días, a saber, la Ley
de las Doce Tablas, las Instituciones de Cayo y los Digestes de Justiniano,
examinaremos qué peculiaridades de la consideración y resolución de casos
demostró cada una de estas etapas; cómo se establecieron las opiniones
tradicionales sobre el comportamiento de las partes y del tribunal en el
proceso; qué requisitos principales se aplicaban a la justicia en materia civil
en el derecho romano. En el curso del trabajo se utilizaron los siguientes
métodos: esencial, comparativo, histórico general
Palabras clave: legis actiones, procedimiento de formulario, cognitio.
1. Legal Procedure in Roman private law
Roman law received its second name – “the law of action” because
Roman lawyers acknowledged only those things that had an action for its
provision as law. The Roman people, like many others, had experienced the
era of private savage punishment of violators of law before the creation of
a state court. Everyone who considered his right to be violated took the law
into his own hands with those who inicted an oense. The most common
ways of protecting rights were self-defence and arbitrariness, which, in fact,
were examples of blood revenge since the victim himself was the judge.
The transition from private punishment to state court trials was gradual.
At rst, the rules of use of violence against the oender were established;
then the alternative in form of redemption for crime was suggested. It was
foremost caused by the fact that state authorities began to pay signicant
attention to the internal state structure. Sorting out relations between
private persons and their families became an undesirable phenomenon.
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 39 Nº 71 (2021): 921-941
It is worth noting that Roman lawyers didn’t have special science of
civil process and didn’t single it out as a separate branch of law. The word
“processus” was never used by Romans in the sense which it has in the
modern law. In the works of Gaius and Justinian, the teaching of civil law
and legal proceedings is one entity. For example, in the Laws of Twelve
Tables, the rst tables are devoted to the issues of legal procedure, and
the structure of the Gaius Institutions reects the signicance of legal
proceedings and the protection of rights.
The judicial procedure of the protection of rights in Rome went through
three stages in its development, reecting the following forms:
1) legis actiones;
2) formulary procedure, which were together called the ordinary
processes,
3) and cognitio or extraordinary.
The rst process received its name from legis actionеs, which translates
from Latin as “lawsuits” and dates from the period preceding the publication
of the Laws of Twelve Tables and until the middle of the 2nd century BC.
The formulary procedure received its name from the formula of the
praetor or per formulas in Latin and for some time coexisted with legis
actiones. It corresponds to the time of classical period of Roman law, since
it was used from the middle of the 2nd century B.C. till the 3rd century BC.
Legis actiones and formulary procedure were carried out in two phases:
the rst phase, during which the action took place in the presence of the
magistrate, and the second phase, which took place in the presence of a
judge. This was the usual order of consideration of the case, therefore these
processes are called ordinary.
The formulary procedure was used in jurisprudence until the time of
Dominat, and it nally disappeared from the courts in 342, under the
constitution of Constance and Clement.
In contrast to ordinary processes, the cognitio procedure (extraordinaria
cognition) was carried out only in the presence of a magistrate, that is, a
public ocial, so it was called extraordinary. It was in practice in Rome
and Italy from the time of August and began to be actively developed under
Andrian when the emperor delegated the consul or other magistrate the
right to interfere in certain aairs that aected the interests of individuals.
All these litigations have become a reection of the aspirations of
society and the state policy of protecting rights. It is in them that the basic
procedures and rules for the administration of justice have been formed,
which are still considered traditional in the countries which were recipients
of Roman law.
924
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
2. Ordinary Roman lawsuits: legis actionem and per formulas
The main source (although incomplete) of information about the ancient
civil process in Rome is the Roman lawyer Gaius, who considers the issue
in the fourth book of his work “Institutiones” – Institutions. Gaius reports
that the oldest form of the civil process in Rome was the so-called legis
actiones. (I. 4. 11)
Gaius ambiguously expresses what exactly “Lege agere” means: either it
is to le a legal claim, which means “certis verbis agеre”, or to le a lawsuit
with certain xed and unchangeable words.
The ling of a claim is not permitted, unless otherwise provided by law or
nulla legis actio sine lege. This is the most signicant feature of the legislation
process, which will later become the main reason for its replacement with a
formulary showing its excessive formalization. According to J. Pokrovsky,
“lege agree” in ancient times simply meant “to act, to exercise the right in
a lawful way, in opposition to violence” 5. Consequently, the process was
called legis actiones.
To begin the process, the mandatory condition was the personal presence
of both the plainti and the defendant. In this case, the question is how to
force the defendant to appear in court, as his absence would prevent the
process. A characteristic feature of Old Roman law is that the state power
itself did not summon the defendant and did not force him to appear. It was
the plainti who had to bring the defendant. To this end, the plainti was
provided with a tool such as in jus vocation (summons to court). The rst
resolutions of the laws of the Twelve Tables were devoted to this matter.
Legis actiones procedure is based on strict formalism and complex
rituals, with the use of certain gestures, words, and special verbal formulas.
The process consists of two stages: in jure and in judicio.
The purpose of the in jure stage was to establish exclusively the legal
side of the case, which is the existence of a claim and compliance with the
procedure associated with it. This stage took place before the magistrate,
which was endowed with the relevant jurisdiction (juristio – from the
words jus dicere – “say the right”, i.e. to apply the legal rules). First spoke
the consul, then the praetor (peregrinus for disputes with foreigners and
urbanus for disputes between the Romans), and aedile in the event of
disputes related to the market. The parties had to appear in person, as the
representation was not allowed, and nobody could act on behalf of another
person (or lat. Nemo alieno nomine agere potest). This stage ended with
the magistrate appointing a judge for its consideration, having established
the conformity of the brought suit with its established form in the law, and
the case went to the second stage.
5 Pokrovskyi I.А. History of Roman Law. – Moscow: Statut, 2004. – p. 101
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
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The stage in judicio was devoted to solving another task, which is
verication of the actual part of the case. This task was performed either
by a permanent board or a specially created jury for the case, or a judge
(individually), or an arbitrator selected by the parties. The process ended
with making a decision (sententia), which concluded the dispute between
the parties.
Gaius stated that there are ve basic forms of legis actio or ve types of
lawsuits that are brought in accordance with the law (lege autem agebatur
modis quinquae).
1. Legis actio per sacramentum.
In essence, it is a process in the form of a bet, when by expressing the
claim, the plainti contributed a certain amount of money (sacramentum)
and demanded that the defendant would spend the same amount. Since
only one of the parties can be favoured in the dispute, its sacramentum
is considered just, and the one given by the other party is unjust (utrius
sacramentum justum sit, utrius injustum).
This means that legitimate doubts about the encroachment of one party
smoothly transferred the process from material to personal – legis actio
sacramento in personam, which, unfortunately, remained unknown to
us. The winning party in the process was the one whose sacramentum was
considered just, while sacramentum made by the other party was charged
to the proceeds of the treasury. Various private disputes could be resolved
in the form of legis actio, except those for which independent claims were
foreseen (I. 4.13).
The general form acquired certain characteristics depending on whether
it was about belonging to a particular thing (actio in rem) or about the
liability of the defendant to the plainti (actio in personam).
1) Аctio in rem manifests in a dispute about the seizure of things by one
person from another. Under the rules, the property on dispute was delivered
to the magistracy. If the thing was something that was hard to deliver, then
some part of it was necessary to be brought (for example, a sheep from
the disputed ock). If the subject of the dispute was a piece of land, then
some amount of its soil was brought, which performed exclusively ritual
functions (I. 4.17).
This norm can be explained by the presence of several logical reasons.
First, the court proceedings, without the certainty that the thing really
exists, and one of the parties owns it, makes the court absurd, since the main
purpose of the appeal was not the conduct of the court proceedings, but the
establishment of fairness by a court decision, for example, the transfer of
the thing to its owner. Secondly, this thing, available at the moment of the
926
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
beginning of the dispute, could disappear and thereby render the whole
process pointless, so it was necessary to solve its fate at the time of the
dispute. This norm can be considered a prototype of the modern institute
for the provision of claims.
The plainti, holding in his hands a spear called vindicta, proclaimed a
precisely dened formula: Нanc ego rem ex jure Quiritium rneam esse ajo;
sicut dixi ecce tibi vindictam imposui! I claim that this thing belongs to
me according to the right of quirts, in arming this, I impose a vindict!
This moment of armation of the right to a thing is called lat. vindicatio,
hence the legal ways to protect the right to claim are called vindicatory.
In response, contrvindicatio took place – the implementation of similar
actions and the declaration of the same words by the defendant. Then the
praetor ordered both parties to leave the thing and each party introduced
sacramentum at the request of the other, and the praetor transferred the
thing to the temporal use of the plainti or defendant for the resolution of
the dispute. Everything that happened was recorded and witnessed by the
people present (litis contestatio). This concluded the stage in jure and the
in judicio stage began. The parties, with the participation of the magistrate,
chose a private judge who then resolved the dispute and made a decision
without the participation of state authorities. For the conduct of the second
stage there were no forms or rituals. Party statements and provision of
evidence happened in a free form.
2) Аctio in personam is less known, because the full description of the
ritual of this case was lost. It is likely that the plainti started with the
statement “Ajo te mihi centum dare oportere”, which is, “I claim that you
must pay me 100”; the defendant denied with “nego me tibi centum dare
oportere” (“I deny that I owe you 100”). Then the process took place in the
order indicated earlier.
2. Legis actio per manus injeсtionem.
This type of procedure was used to collect debts. In order to do this, the
creditor delivered the debtor to the magistrate, declared his debt in verbal
form and laid the hand (manus) on the debtor (hence the name of the
form). The debtor himself could not dispute his debt. This could be done
for him by another person, who would be called vindex, i.e. a person, who,
in fact, vouched for the debtor and risked to pay the plainti double amount
of money (in duplum) if the contestation failed to succeed. In the absence
of a vindex the debtor was brought at the creditor`s disposal. The law of the
Twelve Tables gave the debtor 30 days to pay the debt, the failure of which
could lead to debtor`s dissection (Table III of the Law of Twelve Tables ).
Discussions about the application of this law are still on-going but no
one better than Shakespeare in The Venice Merchant succeeded to describe
its essence.
927
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 39 Nº 71 (2021): 921-941
Petelius law of 326 BC substantially limited the Law of Twelve Tables
by abolishing the right of the creditor to sell and kill the debtor. At the time
of Julius Caesar, legislation was reformed and, according to T. Mommsen
“a large legal principle was proclaimed, claiming that freedom does not
depend on property, but is the primordial right of a person, which can be
taken by a state only from the criminal, but not from the debtor”6.
3. Legis actio per pignoris capionem.
In this case, it is not about applying to the magistrate, but about the self-
employed actions of the plainti (grabbing a certain thing of the debtor and
keeping it to pay the debt). A person who had a claim to another person, in
the case of non-payment, pronounced certain ocial words (which have
not reached us), took the debtor’s thing.
These actions were carried out without the participation of a public
authority and, possibly, in the absence of the debtor himself. The latter
circumstance essentially distinguishes the third form from the others. In
any case, the seizure of things was accompanied by the proclaiming of
verbal formulas, which testify to the legitimate grounds for seizure. The
application of such actions was possible only with some religious or public
demands, for example, when collecting animal fees sold for sacrice or a
soldier demanding from a treasurer to pay for military service.
4. Legis actio per judicis postulationem.
It should be noted that the corresponding place of Gaius’s “Institutions”
was lost. What is known about this form is only that during the in jure
stage it was manifested in the request for appointment of a judge without
sacramentum. It is believed that this form was used in cases where both
parties were not sure of their righteousness and everyone was afraid of
losing the sacramentum. The parties themselves had to rst come to a
certain agreement not to require each other to pay sacramentum. And
this is possible only in conditions where the parties recognized the rights
of each other, but without noticing their limits they apply to the court as
an arbitrator to resolve the dierences that arose between them. O. Joe
believes that the specied form of the process was used in the distribution of
property and in other cases of the same type, for example, after the refusal
of the defendant to pay the debt, the plainti stated: “If you refuse, then I
ask you, praetor, that you give us a judge or an arbitrator”.
According to M.H. Garcia Garrido, the emergence of this kind of claim
has become progressive in the development of the Roman process7. This
6 Mommsen Т. History of Rome / Vol. 1, second edition, stereotype. – Saint-Petersburg: “Nauka”, 2005. – p. 176.
7 Garsia Garrido М. H. Roman Private Law: Cases, actions, institutions / Transl. from Spanish; editor L.L.
Cofanov. – Moscow.: Statut, 2005. – p. 170.
928
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
claim established the legal right of the parties to request the appointment
of a judge or arbitrator. For the rst time, such a lawsuit was referred to
as a means of collecting debt from the template, as well as for distribution
of inheritance. Litsinius Law of 210 BC applied this particular suit for the
division of a common thing.
5. Legis actio per condictionem.
The evidence on this form is such that it makes it possible to summarize
only the general idea: the parties rst appealed to the praetor about the
appointment of a judge while his actual appointment took place after 30
days and the case moved from the stage in jure to the stage in judicio (I.
4. 18).
For what purpose this form was introduced and what specic needs
it served remains unknown. There are no reports of either the old or the
modern sources of anything denite about it. Even Gaius points out that it
is unclear how to implement the legal process legis actio per condictionem:
As for claims on obligations, it was possible to use both legis actio per
sacramentum and legis actio per judicis postulationem. Gaius reports that
this form was introduced by two laws – lex Silia and lex Calpurnia (269
BC). Legis actio per condictionem is the latest form and belongs to the
Republican period. The law of Sylia established such a form for collecting a
certain amount of money on demand, while by the law of Kalpurnia it was
done for a certain item (Gaius I. 4.19).
These ve forms formed the oldest Roman court procedure legis
actiones. It was in this form that it functioned in the rst half of the
republican period and is described us to Gaius. The rst three forms of
the process are adversarial because they result in a litigation between the
plainti and the defendant. The last two forms can be called “executive”,
since their purpose was to ensure the eectiveness of a court decision or the
exercise of a recognized right.
Summarizing briey, it should be noted that, rst, the legis actiones
procedure showed the desire and the need to establish common rules
for resolving a dispute between individuals. Whether in the law or in the
agreement recognized by both parties to the dispute, there were established
successive rules on which the case was considered by the court.
Secondly, the rst legis actio are prototypes of modern procedural
actions, for which the form, the content and their temporal limits are
important. Each action must be clearly dened by pre-approved rules and
implemented at a denite stage. These are the rst forms of the requirements
that relate to the form and content of procedural documents, as well as the
procedural deadlines dened by modern procedural law.
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 39 Nº 71 (2021): 921-941
A characteristic feature of the legis actiones procedure is its division
into two stages: in jure and in judicio. This is a reection of the stages of
modern proceedings in the case, each of which has its purpose and ensures
the achievement of the result.
Proceedings in jure were carried out before the magistrate only in
Rome at rst, and then in prefectures, municipalities and colonies. It was
held publicly on the square (comitium), before magistrate (pro tribunali).
The judiciary was implemented by consuls and later by newly created
magistrates – praetors.
Thirdly, litigation has always been associated with costs and Sacramento
can be considered the rst cost of legal proceedings, which was paid as a
court fee for appealing to the court and was lost by the party which lost the
case. But the actual court fee for appealing to the court is a novel of a later
formulary procedure.
From ancient times Roman law limited individuals who frivolously
treated the lawsuits in two ways: a ne or a holy oath.
At the same time, it is in Roman private law where we can see the
development and changes that took place with the judicial processes during
the time of the existence of the Roman state, analyze how the legal process
is connected and dependent on the state structure and form of government.
In the rst half of the period of the republic the legis actionеs system
continued to operate, but with certain additions and changes. Signicant
changes occurred in the process of legis actio per manus injentionem. If,
according to the general rule, the debtor could not defend himself, then
during the period of the republic certain laws provided for the right of
the debtor to protect himself independently in certain cases (manum sibi
depellere).
Despite some improvements, legis actionеs more and more lacked the
ability to meet the requirements of society and economic relations, which
developed in the conqueror country quite quickly. The formalism of the
procedure was kept and the slightest mistake in the formulation of the
claim led to a loss. Therefore, appropriate litigation reform was necessary.
Most likely, the new form of the process, according to Y. Pokrovsky8 and
C. Sanlippo9 was borrowed from the process between the peregrinus, or
from the process that was used in the provinces.
Consequently, since the times of Augustus, the legis actiones procedure
remained in force only for inheritance cases, however, legis actio sacramenta,
in jure cessio, manumissio, vindicta also remained in use.
8 Pokrovskyi I.А. History of Roman Law. – Мoscow: Statut, 2004. – p. 175
9 Sanlipo Chesare. Course of Roman Private Law: Textbook/ editor D.V. Dozhdev – Мoscow.: Publishing house
BEK, 2002. – p. 100
930
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
The formulary process put an end to rituals and the extreme formalism
of the latter. The gestures and predened words are replaced with the
praetor formula from which this process takes its name. Just as the legis
actiones, the formulary procedure consisted of two stages, but the stage
in jure had its sole purpose of obtaining a praetor formula. M.H. Garcia
Garrido notes that the typing of praetor written formulas led to the birth of
a saying: “The way the formula is, such is the law”10.
The duty to formulate the subject of the dispute was transferred from the
parties to the praetor. In the formulary process, the parties could express
a case in any words and in any form before the magistrate, and it was the
praetor who provided the claims of the parties with an appropriate legal
form. From the explanations of the parties he deduced the legal essence of
the dispute and described the essence in a special note to the judge, who
was appointed to consider a particular case. This note was a formula, and
since the moment it was received, it was considered to be the case of litis
contestatio, and thus excluded the possibility of applying to the praetor to
protect the same right, for the same reasons, in accordance with the rule of
nie bis de eadem re sit action (the impossibility to initiate the same case
twice).
All formulas were divided into civil and praetorial. Civil formulas
reected legis action and praetorial ones applied to new relationships.
The formula consisted of four mandatory parts (along with the
mandatory part of appointing of a judge (judicis nominatio), for example,
“Octavius judex esto” - Let Octavius be the judge)):
1) a statement of the circumstances from which the claim arises
(demonstratio), for example, an indication that the claim
originated from a debt obligation;
2) the formulation of the claim itself (intentio), which was carried
out in the conditional form (“if it is true that Mucius must pay 100
sestertions” – “si paret Mutio sestertium centum dare oportere”).
Intentio could have been dierent in nature, whether it was a matter
of substantive law or a commitment. Depending on the situation,
claims were divided into personal and tangible;
3) an order for the award of a clearly dened part of the property
(adjudicatio), applied only in cases of division of joint property
and the separation of borders;
4) an order for the award (condemnatio), if the claim is conrmed,
looked like a continuation of the phrase relating to the previous part
of the formula, if what is mentioned is conrmed, “the judge awards,
10 Garsia Garrido М. H. Roman Private Law: Cases, actions, institutions / Transl. from Spanish; editor L.L.
Cofanov. – Moscow.: Statut, 2005. – p. 185.
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and if not, then he denies the claim” (judex condemna, si non paret,
absolve). When the dispute arose about the division of property, the
last part of the formula was called not condemnatio, but adjudicatio:
let it be sued as much as should be sued, (quantum adjudicare
oportet, adjudicato). The content of this part could be dierent: with
the indication of the amount, without indicating the amount or with
the indication of the amount but with setting a certain maximum.
It should be noted that the formulas did not always contain four parts.
Obligatory were judicis nominatio and intentio, because without a
plainti’s claim there would be no lawsuit.
The formula could also contain two auxiliary parts. The rst of them
was called exceptio (objection) and applied in cases where the defendant
did not deny the claim, but his objections prevented its implementation
(for example, the seller demanded payment of the purchase price and the
buyer, without denying the fact of the contract, referred to the fact that the
seller himself has not yet executed the contract – exceptio non adimpleti
contractu).
The second auxiliary part of the formula was called praescriptio. A
statement was introduced to restrict the plainti’s right to the object of the
dispute. For example, if a payment was to be made on a monthly basis, and
the respondent had paid only one month, then the plainti may only claim
unpaid payments.
Іntentio (the subject of a claim) occupies a special place among the
constituent parts of the praetorial formula. It is here that the praetor, along
with the literal use of the old Quirith laws, applied to them a more modern
interpretation or formulated new lawsuits. Over time, individual ways of
protection, provided in the praetor formula to particular individuals in a
particular case were subject to increasing typization with the assignment
of their own names. Such, for example, claims for sold or purchased (actio
venditi, actio empti), claims for recovery of the property by the owner (rei
vindicatio) and others. The formula made in this way was an instruction for
a judge who considered the case on the merits. It dened the limits of the
trial.
The procedure of a formulary trial was as follows. When the parties
appeared before the praetor, the proceedings began with the claimant ling
a claim. The statement was addressed to both the praetor and the defendant.
It was addressed to the praetor in order to ask him for the formula, and
to the defendant to nd out his position. If the defendant acknowledged
the plainti’s claim, the plainti received a claim of execution in the same
way as if the process took place and the decision was made. But usually the
defendant entered into a dispute, then a formula was made according to the
procedure mentioned above.
932
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Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
In the formulary procedure, the notion of jurisdiction (or, in Latin,
ius dicere “to say what is right”) appeared. After setting the formula
the proceeding before the magister was nished, this point is called litis
contestatio.
The proceedings in judicio took place in the following manner. On the
day chosen by the parties by mutual consent (but not later than 18 months
- lex Julia), they should have appeared before the appointed judge for the
second stage of the proceedings. According to general rules, the courts were
represented by private judges or judices privati. Usually, private individuals
(one is most often), three or ve were appointed to be judges. The judge was
appointed by the praetor, but the consent of the parties played the main
role in the selection of a judge. Only if reaching agreement was impossible,
the praetor appointed a judge of his choice.
The transition from the legis actiones procedure to the formulary one
marked the development of new so-called praetorial methods of protecting
private property rights, which opposed Quirith law. The most important of
these methods were:
1. Praetorian stipulations (stipulationes pretoriae), the meaning of
which was as follows. If the Quirith law required extremely complex
forms of contract, then in the case of a mere promise to take certain
actions given by one person to another before the praetor, the latter
acknowledged this informal promise to be legally binding and
enforced its execution in a compulsory manner. Praetorian templates
could be used as a means of resolving a dispute between the parties.
So, “if the damage is caused by the amount of 100 sesterces and
the injured person is ready to pay it,” the parties could legally draw
up their relationship, appearing before the praetor and saying one
phrase: the victim says: centum dare spondes? (do you promise to
give 100?); the oender answers: spondeo (I promise). From the
moment of the announcement of the said phrases, the obligation was
considered to have arisen and was received compulsory protection
from the praetor.
2. Introduction in possession (missio in possessionem). It could be
extended not only to individual things (in rem), but also to property in
general (in bona). The need for such a method arose, for example, in
cases where a person, who was not considered to be the heir according
to Quirith law, acquired inheritance rights under praetorian law. In
these cases the praetor introduced it into the possession of hereditary
property, thereby minimizing the rights of the Quirith heirs;
3. Restoration of the previous situation (restitutio in integrum).
The Quirith law’s formalism was manifested not only in the strict
observance of the established procedure, but also in the fact that
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CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
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when it was observed, its legal consequences came irrespective of
the real shortcomings of such a procedure. For example, if the seller
rejected the property due to threat or violence from the buyer, then
Quirith law did not take into account such circumstances. It adhered
to the principle: coactus voluit tarnen voluit (wanted under coercion,
but still wanted). In contrast to this the praetor in the presence of the
injustice of the act, although formally and properly implemented, did
not give it legal power and obliged to restore the situation that existed
before the implementation of such an act (the parties returned the
received property, the victim was compensated for damage, etc.);
4. Interdict (interdicta). Among the specic praetorial methods of
protecting private property rights, interdicts had the most signicant
practical signicance11.
If a certain fact was not reected in the Quirith law, but the praetor
considered it worthy of legal recognition, such recognition was ensured
through an interdict, which the praetor, at the request of the person
concerned, obliged the judge to make the appropriate decision upon
conrmation of the circumstances mentioned by that person. Due to the
interdicts, such an important institution of Roman law as the protection of
possession was modelled, as well as other legal provisions that appeared in
the formulary procedure.
In brief summary, it is worth mentioning the following. First, the
formulary procedure became more complex and perfect. The inalienable
procedural documents of legal proceedings, the prototype of a statement of
claim, in which the subject matter of the dispute and court decision were
formulated, appeared.
Secondly, with the introduction of the formulary procedure, access
to judicial protection was simplied and representatives of the parties
appeared.
And lastly, the list of means of proof expanded, and its rules became
more understandable. Competition was provided by the right of parties to
prove their correctness, and the impartiality of the judge was provided by
the right to assess evidence.
3. Cognitive (extraordinary) procedure
In the classical era, along with the usual process, which was divided into
two stages, jus and judicium, there were occurrences where disputed cases
11 Ioe О.S., Musin V.А. The Fundamentals of Roman Civil Law. –Leningrad: Publishing House of Leningrad
University.–1975. – p. 24
934
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Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
were considered by the magistrate without transferring the case to a judge.
Such a special, extraordinary procedure for dealing with cases was called
extra ordinem and gradually became applicable in such categories of cases
that were previously considered in the formulary process.
The grounds for applying in an extraordinary manner was the lack of
protection in civil law and in the forms of ordinary litigation. In this case,
the person could apply to the magistrate with a request to protect him by
administrative means of power. If the magistrate considered the request
worthy of attention, it itself solved the case, made a decision and executed
it. This administrative review was called cognito or notion, and the process
was called cognition extraordinarium.
During the republic period such a process was a rare event, its active
development dates back to the era of the reign of Augustus and in the end
of III century AD, with the transition to an absolute monarchy it completely
superseded the formulary process.
The reason was quite simple: in the conditions of the empire there was
no condence in elected judges – private persons – and to give them power
to resolve disputes meant to divide the absolute power. Therefore, these
functions began to be performed by imperial ocials, and the judiciary
gradually but nally moved from the hands of praetors to praefectus urbi
(head of city police).
Cases were also personally considered by the imperial governors of the
provinces – praesides or rectores. Since 294, the Emperor Diocletian issued
an order to the rulers of the provinces to solve the cases by themselves,
which secured extraordinaria cognitio as the only form of litigation.
Thus, the extraordinary process is the process of consideration of the
case by the administrative bodies and ocials appointed for the position.
Such changes signicantly inuenced both the principles and the
procedure for dealing with cases. First of all, signicant changes took
place in the general principles of the trial. If in the ordinary proceedings
the consideration of the merits and the judge’s decision were based on the
consent of the parties, then the whole process was built on the authorities’
power and the decision was built on the order of authorities12.
The consideration of the case became public in nature and took place
only in the presence of the parties and especially the venerable persons who
had the right to be present at the consideration, which occurred indoors.
If the plainti did not appear at the trial, the trial stopped. In the absence
of the respondent, the case was considered in absentia. Almost everything
that happened in the court was recorded in the judicial record.
12 Pokrovskyi I.А. History of Roman Law. – Мoscow: Statut, 2004. – p. 248
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Finally, the process was not free: the parties of the dispute were required
to make certain court fees for oce expenses.
The procedure for summons to court changed. It was now ocially
involved with the participation of a government ocial. The plainti’s
complaint was led with the court’s report and then ocially reported to the
defendant. This method of summons to court was called litis denuntiatio.
The lack of division of the process into two stages led to the
disappearance of litis contestatio. But since the moment of the trial had
material and procedural consequences, for the sake of these consequences,
litis contestatio refered to the moment the parties established a dispute,
that is, when the plainti declared the defendant his claim in court, and
the defendant expressed his intention to challenge it. After this, the judge
began the examination of the case on the merits, verication of evidence,
etc.
Proofs in the process were: testimony of the parties, testimony of
witnesses, evidence of a documentary nature, expert assessments,
presumptions13.
The acknowledgment of the parties was understood as the testimony
given by the party overseen by the request of the other party. All that was
said under oath was taken as truth.
Presumption as a means of proof was to relinquish the need to provide
evidence in the event when facts were found from which the judge derided
certain legal consequences: when the presumption could not be countered
by any evidence; the presumption was admitted because the other party
could not refute it with other evidence.
The role of witnesses was less signicant. However, there were rules
that determined the criteria for assessing witness testimony by judges.
Witnesses were supposed to respond when the party requested it.
Proof of documentary character prevailed over testimony of witnesses.
Government documents issued by ocials were considered the most
reliable type of evidence, since they were based on the authority of the state
power. Documents drawn up by notaries were also considered to be reliable
evidence if conrmed by the oath of notary. Documents of a private nature
were of probative value only if they were conrmed by testimonies from at
least three witnesses.
In this period the conclusions of experts-representatives of dierent
professions (doctors, midwives, scribes) continued to be used.
13 Garsia Garrido М. H. Roman Private Law: Cases, actions, institutions / Transl. from Spanish; editor L.L.
Cofanov. – Moscow.: Statut, 2005. p.213-214
936
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
When the case was exhausted, the judge made his decision, lat. decretum.
Now the decision did not necessarily have to formulate satisfaction of the
claim in cash. It may have contained an order for enforcement in natura,
the execution of which the defendant had to ensure.
Unlike the trial of the classical period in the cognitive process, an
appellation of a resolution passed to a higher instance was admitted. Thus,
complaints could be led on the decision praefectus urbi: complaints on
the decision of the ruler of the province were to be led to the head of the
imperial guard (praefectus praetorio), and complaints on his decision were
to be led to the emperor.
The procedure for lodging an appeal was as follows: it was led in
the same court where the decision was made by oral application “I am
appealing”, or in writing, through the submission of the so-called appellate
plaque, within 2-3 days (10 days - according to the Newlines of Justinian),
starting from the day when the parties learned about the court decision14.
The judgment, which was not challenged, was considered nal after the
expiration of the time limit for the appeal, and the process of its execution
began. If the decision was appealed, then the execution was temporarily
stopped15.
In addition to appellation (appeal), there were other means to cancel a
court decision. In the cognitive process, the use of the restitution procedure
considerably expanded. In particular, the restitution was applied if the
decision was rendered on false evidence or if the judge made a decision as a
result of a mistake, knowingly or threatened.
The court decision was appealed to the authorities by the request of the
plainti. In the case of the awarding of the defendant the return of a certain
thing, it was forcibly removed (manu militari) if, within two months, the
defendant did not reject it voluntarily. If a sum was awarded, the bailis
seized the defendant’s amount or a certain thing sold for satisfaction of the
plainti’s claim. The recovery of all debtor’s property took place only when
claims were led by several creditors of the debtor, while the debtor did not
transfer the property voluntarily to their satisfaction.
The execution of decisions was now only the nal part of the proceedings.
In order to violate enforcement proceedings it was not necessary to le
a separate claim (as it was in the formulary process), but rather a simple
request from the party concerned.
14 Some of the following modern features of the appeal procedure we may nd here, O
Uhrynovska ‘Novelization of Civil Procedural Legislation of Ukraine in Cassation Review: Panacea or
Illusion? (2020) 4(8) Access to Justice in Eastern Europe 209-225.
15 Garsia Garrido М. H. Roman Private Law: Cases, actions, institutions / Transl. from Spanish; editor L.L.
Cofanov. – Moscow.: Statut, 2005. – p. 215
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Another kind of litigation became a specic form of the cognitive
process, which under Justinian was called the libellar process. This name
was given by the much more active development of written acts, libelli, than
it had been before.
The beginning of such a process was the libellus conventionis or the
petition. Thus, the process began with the ling of a claim libellus
conventions, which had to be led with copies.
Having checked the formal correctness of the request, the court itself
sent it through its contributing defendant with a proposal to appear at the
specied time before the court. The runner had to obtain the provision of a
valid appearance (cautio judicio sisti) from the respondent. Otherwise, the
defendant could be arrested. If the defendant had objections to the claim,
they were also laid out in writing, libellus contradictionis. The case was
being processed in the same manner as before. The decision was also given
in writing and now had the old name sentential. If the defendant did not
appear in court, the proceedings continued in the form of an out-of-court
process. The out-of-court process had serious procedural consequences.
In this case, the defendant was no longer entitled to appeal the decision.
He could hardly win the process and obtain a justiable decision, since he
could not refute the evidence provided by the plainti.
The liberal cognitive process was dierent from the previous ones
in the issue of evidence. The means of proving were the same as in the
extraordinary, but now the judge had the right to independently investigate,
examine and obtain various evidence for using them in the course of the
proceedings16. This is evidenced by the development of an inquisitorial
model of legal proceedings17.
Also, the principle of limitation in assessing evidence was introduced:
now the judge could not investigate the evidence at his own discretion but
should have been guided by legislative acts.
These changes in the post-classical process were signicant but they
were unlikely to indicate the emergence of a new process. All characteristic
features of the cognitive process were preserved.
Summarizing, it is worth mentioning the following. The transition to an
extraordinary process of cognition indicates a signicant impact of the state
and state bodies on judicial activity.
16 See more about modern sources of a judge power in investigation of facts in Izarova Iryna, Szolc-
Nartowski Bartosz, Kovtun Anastasiia Amicus Curiae: Origin, Worldwide Experience and Suggestions
for East European Countries Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 60, No 1, 2019, Рp. 18–39.
10.1556/2052.2019.60.1.3
17 Izarova Iryna, Flejszar Radoslaw Summaries of the conference “Small claims procedure: the European
and the Ukrainian experience” in Access to Justice in Eastern Europe, 2018, Issue 1, Pp. 81-84.
938
Kravtsov Serhij, Vlasenko Serhii, Rozhnov Oleh y Iryna Malinovska
Legal procedure in roman law and its reection in modern civil procedure
First and foremost, the formation of a bureaucratic apparatus of ocials
that implemented judicial power led to the emergence of professional
judges who were familiar with the proceedings, as well as the law applicable
to the resolution of the dispute. On the other hand, the combination of the
functions of the administrative executive power and the judiciary negatively
aected the procedure for the administration of justice as it led to the
disappearance of such elements as the publicity and veracity of the process
and led to the secrecy of the consideration of the case.
The introduction of such new institutions as an appeal, which allowed to
correct court errors, is also of signicant importance.
4. Conclusions: On the impact of Roman law on the
regionalization of the civil process in modern Europe
For centuries general principles and rules for the administration of
justice were established in Roman private law. They relate not only to
procedural law, but also to the legal status of judges and the judiciary in
general. The relationship between the court system and the judicial process
is evident precisely on the example of Roman litigation.
At the time of the occurrence of the rst trials there was the formation
of their main principles, general provisions, which play an important role
today. These are the ideas of equality of everyone before the law and the
court, openness and publicity of the administration of justice, adversarial,
compulsory court decision, etc., which became traditional in the idea of the
administration of justice in European civilization18.
Among the basic principles of the Roman lawsuits, which became the
general foundations of the modern European civil process, one should
distinguish the following:
1. the main purpose of the trial is to resolve the dispute by establishing,
by means of evidence, the circumstances of the case, determined by
the requirements of the plainti and objections of the defendant;
2. the consideration of the case occurs through the implementation
of certain and orderly procedural steps, which are carried out in
stages, binding to all participants and the court;
3. publicity and openness, which were realized with the help of a single
language of legal proceedings;
18 Izarova Iryna Strengthening Judicial cooperation in civil matters between the EU and neighboring
countries: the example of Ukraine and the Baltic states Baltic Journal of Law &Politics, Volume 12, No
2, 2019, Pp. 115-133. 10.2478/bjlp-2019-0014
939
CUESTIONES POLÍTICAS
Vol. 39 Nº 71 (2021): 921-941
4. the claim is a means of initiating the process; accordingly,
determinative for the civil process is the principle of discretion; the
dynamics of the process in the future depends on the presence of
the plainti;
5. the parties of the process are both parties: the plainti and the
defendant, who in the adversarial process prove their rightness; in
conjunction with the idea of equality of rights of the parties, which
was reected in the rst table of the laws of the Twelve Tables; these
principles became one of the most evolutionary achievements of
Roman law;
6. the case ends with the adoption of a decision for the implementation
of which there is a special procedure, since judicial proceedings are
not aimed at persons who seek protection of their rights.
The regionalization of the civil process in modern Europe testies the
importance and necessity of addressing the general principles of legal
proceedings. The idea of creating a unied European code of civil process
19 is updated with a more in-depth study of the foundations of Roman
litigation. The idea of creating a unied European code of civil process is
updated with a more in-depth study of the foundations of Roman litigation.
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Esta revista fue editada en formato digital y publicada
en diciembre de 2021, por el Fondo Editorial Serbiluz,
Universidad del Zulia. Maracaibo-Venezuela
Vol.39 Nº 71