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Vol. 40, Nº 72 (2022), 182-202
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
The role of populist parties in
spreading Euroscepticism
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4072.10
Dmytro V. Nelipa *
Yana O. Balinska **
Abstract
The aim of the paper was to analyse the current level of
Euroscepticism in the European Union, to identify the current
challenges populist parties face in the Euroscepticism realities
and promotion. The main method of research was the observation
method, which, together with the comparative method, revealed
the selected issues of the paper. The conducted research has
shown that the rise of populist parties primarily reects a
response to a wide range of rapid cultural changes undermining
the core values and practices of Western societies. At the same
time, the pandemic and changes in public consciousness have
led to a decline in the activity of political parties and the introduction of
Eurosceptic ideas per se. As part of the research, we have argued that the
deepening of European integration is not perceived positively by member
states as well, given the unnatural order of legal relations in the union. The
ndings will also require comparison with the results of the forthcoming
EU elections, which has been identied as a roadmap for further author’s
research.
Keywords: ideas of European integration; Euroscepticism scenarios;
cosmopolitan liberalism; populist party system; United
States of Europe.
* Doctor of Political Sciences, Deputy Dean for Educational Work, Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, 01601, Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID
ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5363-3990
** Graduate student, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National
University of Kyiv, 01601, Kyiv, Ukraine. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1764-0074
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El papel de los partidos populistas en la difusión del
Euroescepticismo
Resumen
El objetivo del trabajo fue analizar el nivel actual de euroescepticismo
en la Unión Europea, para identicar los desafíos actuales que enfrentan
los partidos populistas en las realidades y promoción del euroescepticismo.
El principal método de investigación fue la observación, que, junto con
el método comparativo, reveló los temas seleccionados del artículo. La
investigación realizada ha demostrado que el surgimiento de los partidos
populistas reeja principalmente una respuesta a una amplia gama de
rápidos cambios culturales que socavan los valores y prácticas fundamentales
de las sociedades occidentales. Al mismo tiempo, la pandemia y los cambios
en la conciencia pública han provocado un declive en la actividad de los
partidos políticos y la introducción de ideas euroescépticas per se. A modo
de conclusión, los autores han argumentado que la profundización de la
integración europea tampoco es percibida positivamente por los estados
miembros, dado el orden antinatural de las relaciones legales en la unión.
Los hallazgos también requerirán una comparación con los resultados de
las próximas elecciones de la Unión Europea, que se han identicado como
una hoja de ruta para futuras investigaciones sobre el tema.
Palabras clave: ideas de integración europea; escenarios de
euroescepticismo; liberalismo cosmopolita; sistema de
partidos populistas; Estados Unidos de Europa.
Introduction
After World War II, relations between peoples of dierent nations became
more cosmopolitan, and numerous bonds linked their lives. The belief that
one lives in a homogeneous nation-state was weakened by ows of workers,
expatriates, tourists, students, refugees, and diaspora communities.
Cosmopolitanism emphasises the value of open national borders, shared
multicultural values, and the diversity of peoples and lifestyles in inclusive
societies (Lauwers et al., 2021). Moreover, cosmopolitan ideas highlighting
open borders and societies are combined with liberal values that challenge
the authoritarian component of populism.
This emphasises the importance of horizontal restraints and balances
in the representative democracy institutions, protection of minority rights,
participation in elections and party membership, and tolerance of social,
intellectual, and political diversity. This includes the process of pluralistic
negotiation and compromise, the contribution of scientic knowledge to
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Dmytro V. Nelipa y Yana O. Balinska
The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
rational policymaking, and the post-war architecture of global governance
and international cooperation. Social liberalism is also related to the
maintenance of equal rights for women and minorities, exible rather
than xed gender roles, changing gender identities and LGBT rights,
environmental protection, and secular rather than religious values.
The long-term processes of generational change at the end of the
20th century have been a catalyst for culture wars, as these changes are
particularly worrying for less educated and older groups in the countries.
Populists support charismatic leaders, reecting a deep distrust of the
establishment and mainstream parties, which are now led by educated
elites with progressive cultural views on moral issues. The current cultural
split separating populists and cosmopolitan liberals is seen as an orthogonal
classic economic class split that dominated party competition in Western
Europe in the post-war decades.
The spread of progressive values has stimulated a negative cultural
reaction among people threatened by such developments. Less educated and
older citizens, especially white males, who were once the privileged majority
culture in Western societies, are outraged when told that traditional values
are “politically incorrect” once they have felt marginalized in their own
countries. Growing support for populist parties has disrupted the politics
of many Western societies.
All these factors together have gradually produced their impact on the
European Union, which has faced a number of compounding problems since
its creation. In particular, the economic crisis and the plethora of refugees,
the results of the British referendum, and the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic in 2020 have shaped the future of Europe over the past decade.
These challenges have contributed to the emergence of populist parties,
both left and right, seeking to undermine the current status quo (Gerbaudo,
2018), posing a threat to democracy.
This is a particularly favourable context for right-wing populist parties,
which base their communication strategy on questioning the political
conditions and foundations of legitimacy of the European Union, leading to
an ideal scenario of Euroscepticism (Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés,
2020). In this context, popular sovereignty functions as a link between
left-wing and right-wing populist political actors. In both cases, they seek
to regain control of their territory and regain lost autonomy in a highly
globalised world in which membership of supranational organisations such
as the European Union denies them the ability to legislate in their own
countries. In Italy, the Five Star Movement was the most popular political
choice in the 2018 elections (Chiaramonte et al., 2018). In the 2017 French
presidential election, the Front National won 7.5 million votes and made it
to the second round, which has never happened before (Ivaldi, 2018).
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In the UK, UKIP campaigned for Brexit, which resulted in an exit
from the European Union (Usherwood, 2019). The Alt-Europe idea, seen
as a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental vision of a European
“community of sovereign states,” “strong nations,” or “fatherland,” that
hates the “centralised” United States of Europe, is now gaining momentum
(Bergmann et al., 2019: 541).
Furthermore, Europe has experienced a crisis of values that has led many
citizens to question the integrity and permanence of the European Union.
This aspect is included in the manifestos of a large number of populist
parties (Vasilopoulou, 2018). Such parties are not opposed to the basic
principles of the European Union, but to those who lead that institution.
In other words, Euroscepticism manifests itself in criticism of certain
policies pursued by the European Union, rather than in condemnation of
the institution itself.
In this context, a clear line can be drawn between the economic and
social aspects of Euroscepticism. In particular, economic Euroscepticism
is common among left-wing and right-wing populists, while cultural
Euroscepticism may focus on national sovereignty or the dierence
between “us and them” regarding immigrants. It is worth noting that there
is a dierence between “soft” and “hard” forms of Euroscepticism. In this
context, opposition to the European Union policy is considered a “soft”
form, whereas opposition to the European integration process is directly
seen as a “hard” form of Euroscepticism.
It should be noted that populism is a diverse phenomenon, which
makes the chosen research topic relevant for analysis in the European
context. Populist movements form an ideology that can be adapted to
multiple contexts, which sees society as divided into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, the pure people, and the corrupt elite (Gerstlé, 2019),
and argues that politics should be an expression of the collective will.
Driven by economic anxiety, political cynicism, and cultural negative
reactions to cosmopolitan elites (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), anti-
establishment movements have often attracted the lion’s share of media
attention around the world. The rise of anti-establishment movements
goes hand in hand with the development of a more controversial form of
political competition, namely, electoral campaigns become increasingly
violent. They rely on political attacks against opponents, become more
and more uncivilised and promote emotional appeals designed to be the
cause of developing fear and anxiety in society. It is worth noting that the
chosen research topic is continually updated by the realities of political
and pandemic challenges, and therefore requires a new level of scientic
inquiry.
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The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
Given the above, the aim of the paper was to identify and expose the
current problems of populist parties in the context of supranational
crises and pandemics, and to assess the level of their direct impact on
Euroscepticism in the European Union. In order to full this objective, we
dened the following tasks: 1) identify contemporary features of populist
parties within the EU Member States; 2) reveal the state of Eurosceptic
sentiment in the EU in the context of today’s global challenges; 3) summarise
the guidelines for improving the response to Euroscepticism in the context
of European integration.
1. Methods and materials
As part of the scientic research, a signicant scientic and
methodological toolkit was approbated, allowing the formation of research
vectors, and reaching well-founded author’s conclusions in the eld under
study. The stages of the research are shown schematically in Figure 1.
The solution of the tasks outlined in the paper was made possible by
using the leading practical method, i.e., observation. This methodological
toolkit made it possible to draw the author’s conclusions on the prospects for
the spread of Eurosceptic ideas within the European Union in the context of
the pandemic and the transformation of the political space after Brexit. At
the same time, when combined with clustering and generalisation methods,
the observation method allowed the projection of leading vectors of
inuence of populist parties on the EU political space within the framework
of increasing globalisation challenges. This method provided support and
grounding for the dubitability of further perspectives on Euroscepticism
ideas as such.
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Figure 1. Generalised vector structure of the paper subject
matter research (own creation)
The comparative method was also useful in grouping the framework
programmes of the leading EU populist parties, comparing them, and
formulating their proactive positions on the Euroscepticism vector. This
method also allowed to draw attention to the negative and unscrupulous
practices of the parties under study in introducing their propaganda ideas.
At the same time, analytical and statistical methods made it possible to
observe trends in the rise and fall of support for certain EU populist parties
in previous national elections. The leading advantage of the study was
the validation of indicators of the transformation of electoral support for
populist parties, which allowed a fragmented projection of the author’s
vision of the prospects for the upcoming EU elections.
The historical-legal method was used to form the author’s view of the
genesis of the development of Euroscepticism trends and the creation
and functioning of populist parties at the level of EU Member States.
The method of content analysis allowed us to distinguish the programme
materials of EU populist parties according to separate quantitative and
qualitative parameters with the subsequent interpretation of the obtained
results; the dogmatic method was used to interpret the essence and content
of Euroscepticism ideas, to improve the conceptual and categorical research
apparatus; the logical and normative method was applied to analyse the
regulatory legal acts on political party activities in the territory of individual
EU states.
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Dmytro V. Nelipa y Yana O. Balinska
The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
Using the formal and dogmatic (logical) method as well as the systematic
method, the objective and subjective attributes of populist parties in the
EU territory are examined and their political shortcomings and vectors
of inuence on the EU political space are identied. The problematic and
chronological method structured the research text, while empirical analysis
helped to compare the historical development of both Eurosceptic ideas
and the emergence of populist party movements.
The research has involved a considerable amount of empirical material,
which has inuenced the formation of the author’s conclusions and
positions disclosed in the paper. In this paper, we have comprehensively
considered and cited thirty-six leading sources.
2. Results
The history of long-term cultural change in Western societies and the
emergence of new green parties and progressive social movements based
on these values is well known. Between 1970 and 1990, the rise of post-
materialist concerns was a major component of social existence. In recent
decades, however, the negative reaction to cultural change has become
increasingly prominent in Western democracies. There are massive cultural
changes taking place throughout advanced industrial societies, which seem
shocking to those who hold to traditional values. Moreover, immigration
ows, especially from low-income countries, have changed the ethnic
composition of advanced industrial societies. New citizens speak dierent
languages and have dierent religions and lifestyles than the indigenous
population, reinforcing the impression that traditional norms and values
are fast disappearing (The Economist, 2019).
Today, Euroscepticism continues to be conventionally interpreted as
direct and unequivocal opposition to the process of European integration.
Euroscepticism can be divided into “hard” and “soft”. Hard Euroscepticism
consists of principled opposition to the EU and may even demand the
withdrawal of these states from the EU or deny them the prospect of EU
membership. Soft Euroscepticism does not entail principled opposition
to the EU but focuses on policy areas where there is a divergence
between national interests and the EU trajectory. All manifestations of
Euroscepticism can be articulated at both party and public (or grassroots)
levels within and outside the EU.
The Euroscepticism of political parties depends on ideology, political,
social and economic circumstances and the dierence between domestic and
foreign policy. Consequently, the participation of Eurosceptics may depend
on pliability and/or situational adaptation. Eurosceptic parties tend to take
a softer stance and do not oppose the idea of European integration as such.
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However, in one way or another, they are opposed to its materialisation.
These euro-rejecting parties take a tougher stance and oppose both the idea
and materialisation. Radical left-wing parties have emerged because of
their institutionalisation, leading to a diversity within the party family from
traditional communists to social populists.
The analytical classication of party Euroscepticism includes the
categories of revisionists, reformists, gradualists, maximalists, minimalists
and refuseniks. The revisionist category opts for a return to the status quo
before the adoption of a major EU treaty/decision, whereas reformists
wish to modify one or more existing EU institutions and/or practices.
Eurosceptic gradualists formally support the European integration process,
although at a slower pace and with more caution. Maximalists are in favour
of moving the existing process as quickly as possible towards higher levels
of integration, while minimalists tend to accept the status quo but oppose
further integration. Finally, the anti-decision parties strongly oppose
participation in the EU or any of its constituent institutions. Within this
mode of interpretation, the dominant brands of Euroscepticism among
Brexit supporters in the ranks of the British Conservatives and smaller
political actors (e.g., UKIP) can be located on a trajectory between a
refusenik and maximalist position that opts for leaving the EU with the
greatest possible benets.
Euroscepticism is a very relevant concept in the study of left-wing
and even right-wing populism. Left-wing Eurosceptics tend to see
European integration as a project embodied on the neoliberal basis of
globalised capitalism. Meanwhile, the two most important areas for right-
wing Eurosceptics in Europe are: (a) varying degrees of opposition to
immigration and insistence on the principle of strict borders; (b) defending
national sovereignty against “Brussels domination.” In Central and
Eastern Europe, as early as the 1990s, a number of parties (usually right-
wing) started articulating their nascent Euroscepticism, according to the
conceptualisation that the EU “imposes” minority rights from the outside
and weakens national sovereignty. Since the outbreak of the 2015 migration
crisis, brands of Euroscepticism among some conservative right-wing
parties have undergone a qualitative transformation; they are no longer
focused on negotiating a compromise on EU membership terms, but rather
nurture ambitions to revise the EU conguration (at least in specic policy
areas) and reform its existing institutions and practices from within.
Eurosceptic parties have largely been accused of running tough
campaigns. Negative messages, intimidation, and even impoliteness, are in
line with the style of Eurosceptic movements, often incorporating strong
populist discourse. Populist rhetoric tends to reect a more transgressive
political style, emphasising agitation, spectacular action, exaggeration,
judicious provocation, and perceived violation of political, social, and
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The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
cultural taboos. Populists often demonstrate an open willingness to challenge
standard social norms by displaying bad manners and introducing a more
negative hard-line tone into the debate. Populists are more confrontational
and aggressive and use more negative and more emotional campaigns. In
this sense, harsher campaigns are typical of Eurosceptics. Most Eurosceptic
parties are on the right (often radical) side of the political spectrum.
In today’s context, populism reects a deep cynicism and dissatisfaction
with existing power, be it big business, banks, multinationals, media experts,
elected politicians and ocials, intellectual elites, and academic experts, as
well as the arrogant and privileged rich people. At the same time, populists
are characterised by an authoritarian preference for the personal power of
a strong and charismatic leadership, which is perceived to reect the will
of the people. Populists also favour direct forms of majoritarian democracy
to express the voice of the people through opinion polls, referenda, and
plebiscites rather than the institutional checks and balances systems and
protection of minority rights that are built into representative democracy
processes.
After all, the populist discourse usually emphasises nativism or
xenophobic nationalism under “ordinary people,” suggesting that “the
people” is one and that states should exclude people from other countries
and cultures. Populism prefers monoculturalism to multiculturalism,
national self-interest to international cooperation and development aid,
closed borders to the free ow of people, ideas, labour and capital, and
traditionalism to progressive and liberal social values (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Conditional model of EU political party sectoral
competition (based on author’s comparative research)
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Three indicators are mainly used today to classify populist parties: the
anti-elite ratings from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2017 (Polk et al., 2017),
the Inglehart and Norris (2016) populist party scale and The PopuList (The
PopuList, 2021). For example, the scale developed by Inglehart and Norris
(2016) combines the party’s expert assessments of the following attitudes
and positions: 1) support for traditional social values; 2) opposition to
liberal lifestyles; 3) promotion of nationalism; 4) support for a strict rule of
law; 5) assimilation for immigrants; 6) support for restrictive immigration
policies; 7) opposition to ethnic minority empowerment; 8) support for
religious principles in politics and 9) support for rural interests. The scale
ranges from 0 to 100, with parties with a rating above 80 classied as
populist. The Populist is a classication developed by a group of more than
70 scholars from across Europe and around the world who dene political
groups as extreme right-wing, extreme left-wing and/or Eurosceptic. Given
the above, it is possible to roughly divide traditional and populist EU parties
into three groups as follows: left-wing, right-wing, and centrist (Figure 3).
Today, unlike most populists of the past, the parties claim to be
committed to democracy, but such a democracy in which the sovereignty
of the people is unlimited and materialised in the image of an all-powerful
leader. These characteristics are common to all populists. By 2020, however,
the most impressive thing was their visible progress in many countries. This
was particularly evident in the 2019 European Parliament elections, when
right-wing populists were the most numerous and strongest.
However, by general recognition, unlike in Hungary, Poland, or the
Czech Republic, most of these right-wing populists did not make it into
power structures, with the exception of Lega Nord in Italy (later known as
Lega). This party has been part of government coalitions four times, most
recently between 2018 and 2019. But although they are in opposition, right-
wing populist parties do inuence the way political vectors of reform are
embodied. In fact, several opponents of populism, such as Matteo Renzi
in Italy between 2014 and 2016, Emmanuel Macron in France during his
2017 presidential campaign and Boris Johnson in the UK deliberately used
populist style to win or even govern.
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Dmytro V. Nelipa y Yana O. Balinska
The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
Figure 3. Classication and examples of EU populist parties (as
summarised by the author)
Voter support for populist parties increased in November 2021 in three
of the 27 European Union member states and fell 10 times in the last
month, according to a poll conducted by Europe Elects (2021), a German
start-up that aggregates opinion poll results from across the EU. According
to Bloomberg calculations, the popularity of far-right parties rose in the
Netherlands, Portugal and Cyprus and fell in Estonia, France, Slovenia,
Latvia, Denmark, Italy, and Poland (Bershidsky, 2021). The biggest increase
of 2.0 percentage points was recorded in the Netherlands and the biggest
drop of 0.8 points was recorded in Estonia. The far-left political forces
expanded in the Netherlands, Spain and Denmark and declined in France,
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus.
Support for the extreme left increased most by 0.5 percentage points
in the Netherlands and fell most by 1.9 points in France. Eurosceptic
parties improved their poll results in the Netherlands, Spain and Finland
and declined in France, Greece, Estonia, Slovenia, Ireland, Portugal, Italy,
Poland, and Sweden. The biggest increase of 3.0 percentage points was in the
Netherlands and the biggest drop of 2.6 points was in France (Bershidsky,
2021). It can be stated that although experts mostly agree that populist
political leaders or parties exhibit a high level of anti-elitism, denitions
of populism dier. Within the EU, there are signicant dierences both
between countries and between the ideological varieties of populism. While
the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in certain
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areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in most
EU countries.
The Covid-19 pandemic has revealed many populist inconsistencies,
incoherencies, and demagogy, whether the respective parties are in
opposition or in power, marking a turning point for the populists, the
beginning of their decline. The population still tends to approve measures
and restrictions, mainly in Italy and France. The occasional populist attacks
on foreigners and migrants are also less evident now when the overall
priority is health. In Italy, mentions of the Lega party are declining in the
polls (although it still accounts for almost a quarter of the electorate and
remains the leading Italian party), as is the popularity of Salvini, who has
been asked by leading members of his own party to change his approach. In
France, Marine Le Pen is well placed in the polls ahead of the rst round of
the 2022 presidential election, receiving between 24% and 27%, according
to an IFOP poll conducted in late September.
Right-wing populist parties in Europe took a huge step towards
unication after 16 right-wing populist parties from 14 countries issued a
joint statement calling for a European Union based on sovereign member
states instead of a federal bloc. The main forces behind the declaration are
the Polish ruling party, Law and Justice, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, Marine
Le Pen’s National Rally, with Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Georgia Meloni’s
Brothers of Italy also present (Zsiros, 2021). The possible emergence of
new populist right-wing forces is not an immediate threat to the current
Brussels establishment, as their number of MEPs will remain unchanged.
In the long run, however, it could ultimately aect decision-making in
the EU. If their parties manage to remain a cohesive force until the 2024
European elections, they will have a chance to position themselves as the
main opposition force in the next European Parliament.
Thus, the 2019 European Parliament elections were held against a
backdrop of growing polarisation around the world, a phenomenon that has
also appeared in these elections, triggered by the recent multi-faceted crises
in the EU. However, a clear sign of polarisation in the EU may be the divisions
associated with European integration, an issue that tends to be much more
relevant to Eurosceptics than to Europhiles. European integration has
moved from a bureaucratic political eld to a highly polarised and topical
issue in European party systems. This increasing prominence began in the
1990s and continues to grow. It is mainly due to political entrepreneurs
pointing out the problem of European integration. The main parties tend to
occupy a pro-integration space and avoid emphasising the issue.
Populist parties have selectively politicised individual crises, while
adopting dierent positions on European integration. There is a dierence
between left-wing and right-wing versions of populist Euroscepticism
politics. At the same time, all left-wing populists have stood their ground in
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The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
criticising Europe mainly in social and economic terms. The Great Recession
provided an opportunity for right-wing populists to develop similar
discourses only to return to culturally inspired notions of Euroscepticism
at the peak of the migration crisis. In Austria, for example, there is already
a long-standing populist radical right-wing party in the Freedom Party
(FPÖ).
It has established itself as a party focused on defending Austrian
identity with an anti-immigration and soft Eurosceptic stance (Hadj Abdou
and Ruedin, 2021). The Flemish interest (VB) is a populist right-wing
radical party which seeks to represent Flemish nationalism and demands
secession from Belgium (Sijstermans, 2021). The Flemish interest is against
multiculturalism and is a soft Eurosceptic. The party won 12% of the vote in
the 2019 national elections (with 18.5% in Flanders) and 12.1% in the 2019
European Parliament elections. In turn, the Civic Alliance is considered to
be the only populist party in Cyprus. It positions itself as “post-ideological”
and focuses its vision on Cyprus and its citizens.
The party is primarily concerned about a peaceful settlement of the
Cyprus issue aiming to remove the Turkish army from the island as the only
prospect for the security and prosperity of all ethnic groups in the common
homeland. In France, there is one of the oldest and most established
populist parties in the form of the Rassemblement National (RN, formerly
Front National). Marine Le Pen’s leadership has changed the position of the
party under its former leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in an attempt to soften the
limits of its hardline stance on immigration, but remains a party that ghts
and mobilises immigration, law and order and national identity.
The Rassemblement National takes a steady stance of soft Eurosceptics
(Buswell, 2021). Hungarian politics in the last decade have been dominated
by Prime Minister V. Orban and the populist Fidesz force (together with
its satellite the Christian Democratic People’s Party). Fidesz’s convincing
victories in the last three general elections have resulted in a parliamentary
supermajority, giving V. Orban ample opportunity to put Hungary on an
illiberal democratic path. Italy presents numerous examples of populism.
The oldest party still represented in the Italian parliament is Lega, a
radical right-wing party that won 34.3% of the vote in the 2019 European
Parliament elections, joining forces with the M5S to form a government
after the 2018 general elections (Vercesi, 2021).
In September 2017, the far-right Alternative for Germany won 12.6 % of
the votes, entering the Bundestag for the rst time with an anti-euro and
anti-immigration platform. In Germany, the economic disparity between
East and West has been used as a plausible explanation for Euroscepticism,
right-wing extremism, and anti-migrant sentiment, which is stronger in the
poorer countries of the former East. The status quo orientation of German
politics became more entrenched and highly unsustainable in European
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politics than in any other sphere. The country was devoid of the political
and economic problems faced by other parts of Europe: the economy was
booming, while unemployment was at record lows and the budget was
balanced.
There was no fundamental erosion of the political party system, as
happened in France or Italy. The Germans therefore had little motivation
for radical change. They were among the biggest beneciaries of the
bloc’s single market and the eurozone. At the same time, Euroscepticism
has grown steadily in many other member states. After Brexit, there
were widespread fears that the EU would break up. Berlin’s response to
this was to prevent the break-up of the EU, but it had no clear idea how
to move forward. It can be stated that Brexit is a clear manifestation of
Euroscepticism and a consequence of the subversion of populist parties.
This event has fundamentally transformed the ideas of the respective
political movements (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Vectors of inuence of EU populist parties on ideas of
Euroscepticism after Brexit (as summarised by the author)
After the Brexit referendum in 2016, the European right-wing populist
parties (PRR) have moved towards an alternative European political
agenda. The Alt-Europe is a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental
vision of a European “community of sovereign states,” “strong nations,” or
“fatherland,” that hates the “centralised” United States of Europe. European
integration has deepened dramatically since the 1980s, has expanded, and
has barely survived a series of existential crises since 2005. The Eurosceptic
PRR parties have beneted from the following politicisation and objection
to the EU. The Brexit referendum campaign pushed them towards the
EUxit campaign.
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Dmytro V. Nelipa y Yana O. Balinska
The role of populist parties in spreading Euroscepticism
However, amid the popular reaction to Brexit chaos and the PRR’s
increased condence in winning over national and European authorities,
they changed their focus to an alternative European reform of the EU.
They use the theses of an ancient ethnic European civilisation of diverse,
peacefully cooperating, free sovereign nations to exclude the EU cultural
unication and present an alternative Europe. This civilisation may
be Christian or secular, conservative or humanist, with free trade or
protectionist steady state, and avaricious or demonstrative of solidarity.
But the PRR will protect it from the articial, homogenising totalitarian
experiment of the EU imposing liberalism and Islamist colonists. At the
same time, it cannot be asserted with certainty that European right-wing
populist parties have gained much support and strengthened their position
in the political space during the pandemic.
3. Discussion
The study has shown that the mainstream parties on both the right
and the left political spectrum have become unable to oer signicant
solutions as state sovereignty has been undermined by a neoliberal form of
globalisation and the EU integration process. States can no longer control
the ow of capital, goods, services, and people; they can no longer control
their borders. Furthermore, authoritative parties do not want to change
the current situation. The above is worrying because political parties have
adopted neoliberalism not only as a set of economic policies, but also as a
rational approach from which to conclude that globalisation is irreversible
and there is no alternative (Sandrin, 2020).
The detrimental economic and political eects of neo-liberal globalisation
and migration patterns have generated aects (anxiety, fear, hatred,
resentment) that are successfully mobilised by right-wing political parties.
This author’s thesis is supported by Sandrin (2020), who points out that
eective and ethical coping strategies should include political discourses
that appeal to the general population and that are inclusive and pluralistic.
This progressive political discourse should try to formulate a response to
these very real fears and anxieties, and which should be adapted to dierent
historical, geographical, and cultural contexts, namely, inclusive, pluralistic
and agonistic.
We can conclude that populist radical right parties have become a
permanent feature of many party systems in European countries, and
their electoral success has increased since 2015, when many migrants and
refugees arrived in the EU (Cordis, 2021). Studies on PRR show that these
parties seek to inuence policy making in dierent ways. In this respect, the
view of Lutz (2019) is correct which is that the growth of PRR can indirectly
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inuence the political positions of major parties by introducing new subjects
or otherwise articulating existing winds of political development, thereby
pushing governments and other parties to change their own positions.
A number of scholars emphasise that PRRs inuence the positions of
other parties directly when they are in government or indirectly by treating
topics such as migration dierently than other parties (Bergmann et al.,
2021). Nevertheless, as Lazar (2020) notes that in France, for example,
populist parties are still unable to attract the large sections of the population
they need to reach the presidency. Also, Eurosceptic movements tend to
be small opposition parties and parties that tend to be negative towards
their opponents (Nai et al., 2021). However, Lega has reinforced its nativist
and populist prole, relying on being an anti-immigration and Eurosceptic
party, but now in terms of a full-edged national force (Taggart and Pirro,
2021). The positions of scholars corroborate the author’s thesis on the
prospects of PRR inuence on the forthcoming EU elections.
As the EU has become a more visible and polarising issue in Western
European party systems, many parties will need to discuss their position
on the EU integration (Wagner, 2021). In fact, the M5S in Italy was the
only actor who oscillated between dierent structures other than the
simple right-wing populist parties (Pirro et al., 2018). Therefore, further
research into whether PRR narratives can be consistent enough to organise
themselves in opposition and undermine the EU would be invaluable
(Cooper et al., 2019). This could be linked to new work on policy positions
within soft Euroscepticism. Policy research mechanisms such as ‘uploading’
and ‘downloading’ could also be borrowed to explore how narratives of
national politics and core identity narratives interact (McMahon, 2021).
The scholars support the author’s position that severe domestic
measures within countries, such as blockades, will inevitably go hand in
hand with border closures and travel restrictions, leading to a temporary
de-globalisation of the world or a partial reversal of certain tendencies of
globalisation due to reduced cross-border movements. While populism in
Western Europe will remain a force to be reckoned with in the foreseeable
future.
The specic manifestations of the COVID-19 pandemic have led to
nationalist populist actors on the political fringes struggling to remain
relevant and to formulate messages that are both at odds with the
establishment and resonate well with the public anxiety associated with
COVID-19 (Dandolov, 2021). The pandemic has led to a signicant loss of
condence in the EU among the population. In turn, Brexit has shown that
deeper European integration is not the natural order of events and that
EU citizens need to understand the benets of membership (Leonard and
Puglierin, 2021).
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The scholarly search has substantiated that the politicisation of European
integration has increased throughout Europe. In southern Europe, the
trend cited should be interpreted as an expression of an alternative vision
of Europe, contrary to the vision that prevails in some north-western
European countries (Kriesi, 2020). On the contrary, in north-western
Europe, where the politicisation of European integration has mainly been
driven by the radical right, and in central-eastern Europe, where it has
mainly been the result of the mobilisation of the conservative nationalist
right, it is an expression of nationalist reaction.
To eectively overcome the further activation of populist parties, it is
advisable to provide more opportunities for European citizens to produce
direct inuence in key decisions that are taken at the supranational level and
aect their lives. Undoubtedly, in this context, the basic social protection
system in the EU needs to be updated and eectively enforced, enabling
people to escape poverty and live a decent life regardless of their country’s
economic inuence.
Conclusions
Despite the PRR’s overall narrative resources, intense nationalist
chauvinism, rivalries, and political proclamations in manifestos will hinder
the PRR’s concrete collaboration to realise an alternative European dream.
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to ruling parties, even in countries
such as Germany, nding themselves at odds with EU institutions and
increasingly looking at issues because of “national” rather than “European”
views, putting some of the major issues of nationalist-populist parties
on their agenda. At the same time, fragmented ideas of Euroscepticism,
produced by the active positions and actions of populist parties, have
receded in the face of the pandemic, giving particular prominence to health
promotion issues.
Some states have begun to oppose the further development of populist
parties by launching active counter-policy. At the same time, an eective
and ethical strategy to counter Euroscepticism should not see the political
arena as a foundation for escalating conict, since this very type of political
discourse has alienated many voters and opened the way for right-wing
populist parties claiming to actually listen to the people’ troubles.
The scholarly debate on the chosen topic showed that the highlighted
issues will need further, more detailed study over the long term. The
COVID-19 pandemic continues to adjust the spread of Eurosceptic ideas
in EU member states. Consequently, the activities of EU populist parties
against the background of supranational changes will require further
comparative analysis, which will be conducted by the author of the paper.
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