Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Derecho Público "Dr. Humberto J. La Roche"
de la Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la Universidad del Zulia
Maracaibo, Venezuela
Esta publicación cientíca en formato digital es continuidad de la revista impresa
ISSN-Versión Impresa 0798-1406 / ISSN-Versión on line 2542-3185Depósito legal pp
197402ZU34
ppi 201502ZU4645
Vol.40 N° 73
Julio
Diciembre
2022
Recibido el 04/12/2022 Aceptado el 06/06/2022
ISSN 0798- 1406 ~ De pó si to le gal pp 198502ZU132
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas
La re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas, es una pu bli ca ción aus pi cia da por el Ins ti tu to
de Es tu dios Po lí ti cos y De re cho Pú bli co “Dr. Hum ber to J. La Ro che” (IEPDP) de la Fa-
cul tad de Cien cias Ju rí di cas y Po lí ti cas de la Uni ver si dad del Zu lia.
En tre sus ob je ti vos fi gu ran: con tri buir con el pro gre so cien tí fi co de las Cien cias
Hu ma nas y So cia les, a tra vés de la di vul ga ción de los re sul ta dos lo gra dos por sus in ves-
ti ga do res; es ti mu lar la in ves ti ga ción en es tas áreas del sa ber; y pro pi ciar la pre sen ta-
ción, dis cu sión y con fron ta ción de las ideas y avan ces cien tí fi cos con com pro mi so so cial.
Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas apa re ce dos ve ces al año y pu bli ca tra ba jos ori gi na les con
avan ces o re sul ta dos de in ves ti ga ción en las áreas de Cien cia Po lí ti ca y De re cho Pú bli-
co, los cua les son so me ti dos a la con si de ra ción de ár bi tros ca li fi ca dos.
ESTA PU BLI CA CIÓN APA RE CE RE SE ÑA DA, EN TRE OTROS ÍN DI CES, EN
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Re vis ta Cues tio nes Po lí ti cas. Av. Gua ji ra. Uni ver si dad del Zu lia. Nú cleo Hu ma nís ti co. Fa-
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Vol. 40, Nº 73 (2022), 506-526
IEPDP-Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas - LUZ
Events in eastern and southern Ukraine
in retrospect of post-soviet relations
DOI: https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.4073.28
Iryna Krasnodemska *
Hanna Chechelnytska **
Abstract
The purpose of the article is to periodize the study of interstate
relations and the course of events in eastern and southern Ukraine
in the period: 1991-2015. The historical and comparative-legal
method was used to solve the problem posed. The article analyzes
the events in eastern and southern Ukraine during 1991-2015,
taking into account Russia’s inuence on social and political
processes in post-Soviet Ukraine through the process of forming
Ukraine’s international subjectivity, which are permanent
factors in bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. In this
context, Russia’s inability to recognize Ukraine as a full-edged
international actor at the legal and substantive level is demonstrated. It
is concluded that the events in Ukraine not only provoked the strongest
confrontation between the two largest states of the post-Soviet space, but
also exposed a number of problems throughout the international security
system. The armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine
was accompanied by numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The competent state authorities must calculate the amount of material and
moral damage caused by Russia.
Keywords: post-Soviet space; Black Sea Fleet; international security;
Crimean crisis; invasion of Ukraine
* Candidate of Historical Sciences, head of the Department of Historical Studies Research Institute of
Ukrainian Studies, street Isaacyan, 18, com. 312 , Kyiv, Ukraine, 01135. ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-
0001-5552-9073
** Ph.D. docent Associate Professor University of Customs and Finance (Dnipro), Department of History
and Theory of State and Law, Street: Vladymyr Vernadskyi st., 2/4, Dnipro, Ukrainе. ORCID ID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3297-0821
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Acontecimientos en el este y el sur de Ucrania en la
retrospectiva de las relaciones postsoviéticas
Resumen
El propósito del artículo es periodizar el estudio de las relaciones
interestatales y el curso de los acontecimientos en el este y el sur de
Ucrania en el periodo: 1991-2015. Se utilizó el método histórico y
comparativo-jurídico para resolver el problema planteado. El artículo
analiza los acontecimientos en el este y el sur de Ucrania durante 1991-
2015, teniendo en cuenta la inuencia de Rusia en los procesos sociales
y políticos en la Ucrania postsoviética a través del proceso de formación
de la subjetividad internacional de Ucrania, que son factores permanentes
en las relaciones bilaterales con la Federación Rusa. En este contexto, se
demuestra la incapacidad de Rusia para reconocer a Ucrania como un actor
internacional de pleno derecho a nivel jurídico y sustantivo. Se concluye
que los acontecimientos en Ucrania no solo provocaron la confrontación
más fuerte entre los dos estados más grandes del espacio postsoviético,
sino que también expusieron una serie de problemas en todo el sistema
de seguridad internacional. La agresión armada de la Federación de Rusia
contra Ucrania fue acompañada de numerosos crímenes de guerra y
crímenes de lesa humanidad. Las autoridades estatales competentes deben
calcular la cantidad de daño material y moral causado por Rusia.
Palabras clave: espacio postsoviético; ota del Mar Negro; seguridad
internacional; crisis de Crimea; invasión de Ucrania.
Introduction
Russia’s inuence on socio-political processes in post-Soviet Ukraine
is considered in a signicant number of works by domestic and Western
authors, so in this study it will be considered only schematically, in order to
reveal the mutual inuence between the internal and external aspects of the
formation of the foreign political identity of Ukraine.
The given list of problematic issues of bilateral relations, is limited to
the problematic of subjectness (corporate identity), demonstrates the close
relationship between domestic and foreign policy, related to the inuence
of Russia on the processes of state and nation in Ukraine and the course of
foreign policy (social) identication of Ukraine, in particular its relations
with the EU, NATO, as well as democratic transformation as a process of
internationalization of European norms and standards.
Therefore, the process of Ukraine’s foreign policy identication as
an international actor is inextricably linked to the assertion of its own
independence from the “signicant other”, the role of which is Russia.
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
1. Materials and methods
The course of events in the east and south of Ukraine is considered by
us on the basis of the use of information sources, applying the following
methods of historical research: periodization, historical-genetic and
historical-systemic. In historical terms, the periods of research of events in
eastern and southern Ukraine are conditionally divided into the following:
the beginning of the establishment of relations between Ukraine and Russia
(1991-1992); the gas conict and resolution of the Black Sea Fleet issue
(1992-2004); the “Orange Revolution” and processes after it (2005-2012);
the political crisis in Ukraine (2013-2014); the beginning of armed conict
in the south-east of Ukraine and the Crimean crisis (2014–2015).
The purpose of this article is to periodize the study of interstate relations
and the course of events in eastern and southern Ukraine in 1991-2015,
taking into account the fact that Russian policy towards Ukraine has never
considered security issues or economic interests as a priority, because
Russian-Ukrainian relations are quite dierent from those between any
other two states (Ash et al., 2015; D’Anieri, 2002; Buckholz, 2019; Giuliano,
2015; Loshkariov and Sushentsov, 2016; Malyarenko and Galbreath, 2016).
2. Literature Review
2.1. Statement of the basic material
The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, adopted on July 16,
1990, opened a new page of establishment of independent and autonomous
Ukraine and played an important role in building a democratic constitutional
order in Ukraine. It was since then that the collapse of the USSR and
Ukraine’s break with the Russian Federation became a reality.
And on November 19, 1990 the USSR and the RSFSR signed a treaty,
which entered into force on June 14, 1991. According to it (Art. 1), it was
supposed that “The parties acknowledge each other as sovereign states
and undertake to refrain from acts that may cause damage to the state
sovereignty of the other party”, and also (Art. 6) the “Parties recognize and
respect the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic within the present
borders within the USSR” (Agreement between the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
1990).
From the rst days of independence, the Ukrainian leadership in its
foreign policy had to consider the interests of neighboring states, groups
(blocks) of states, various transnational groupings at the local, regional
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and global levels, while implementing its geopolitical plans. First of all, it
is necessary to create prerequisites for the establishment of Ukraine as an
equal subject of international relations, creating a documentary basis for
this, to begin the process of integration into the systems of European and
world cooperation in the general political process, to establish independent
economic relations in the international arena, to establish bilateral equal
relations with the states of the world community and with the nearest
neighbors (Hay-Nizhnyk, 2017).
That is why, taking into account the schedule of the world chessboard
and the system of balancing of inuence and opposition, the political
leadership of the country at the dawn of the restoration of its statehood
followed the path of non-alignment and neutrality. However, already 1993
in the “Main Directions of Foreign Policy” approved by the Verkhovna Rada
of Ukraine it was noted that the proclaimed concept of neutrality could not
be an obstacle to full-scale participation of Ukraine in the pan-European
security structure (Hay-Nizhnyk, 2017).
On December 1, 1991, at the All-Ukrainian referendum 90.35% of citizens
supported the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine of August
24, 1991. And already on December 8, 1991 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus signed the Belovezhskoe Agreement on the Establishment of
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As the rst president of
Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk said in one of his interviews: “Ukraine can be
proud of the fact that it is and was, and became in 1991, the country that
broke up the Soviet Union - the last empire, the most terrible” (Regnum
News Agency, 2016: n/p).
And Ukraine, although it became one of the founding countries of the
CIS, did not sign the Decision on the adoption of the CIS Charter. On
December 1, 1991 L. Kravchuk elected as President of Ukraine categorically
refused to conclude any union treaty - not only political, but also economic,
and in May 1992 refused to sign the Agreement on Collective Security of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Ukrainian leadership did
not go beyond the associated membership and did not sign an agreement
on the establishment of the Interstate Economic Committee - the rst
supranational body of the CIS.
Despite the proclamation to build real partnership bilateral relations
with the former Soviet republics in the future, Russia tried to play a
leading role in the CIS. Ukraine’s second president, Leonid Kuchma,
noted in his book “Ukraine Is Not Russia” that society views Ukraine as
a historically inseparable part of Russia that broke away by some strange
misunderstanding (Kuchma, 2003). The conglomerate nature of the post-
Soviet Ukrainian elite has kept the country’s political system running
for many years. It was based on certain attributes of democracy, such as
a competitive political process, caused mainly by many internal factors
(Chernyavsky, 2013).
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
After the collapse of the USSR, it came as a great surprise to both Russia
and Ukraine that a signicant number of conict issues related to the
division of military property and the severance of many years of ties in the
defense and energy spheres emerged. Territorial problems also emerged.
As for the defense-industrial complex, Ukraine inherited from the USSR
the second largest (40%) part of the military-industrial complex. Among
them are 300 such giants as Yuzhmash, Arsenal, Khartron and others.
These enterprises manufactured transport aircraft, missile cruisers,
tanks (Ukraine produced about 50% of Soviet combat vehicles), Zenit,
Cyclone, SS-18, SS-20, SS-23, SS-24, etc.
The main territorial problem was the ownership of the Crimean
Peninsula and the city of Sevastopol, the naval base of the Black Sea
Fleet. Back on November 19, 1990 B. Yeltsin and Kravchuk signed the
rst interstate document that laid the foundation for future relations of
independent Ukraine and Russia, stipulating that both sides: “Recognize
and respect the territorial integrity... within the currently existing borders
within the framework of the USSR” (Wikisource, 2019: 29).
In the early 1990s Ukraine had 15% of the world’s nuclear weapons
capability (third in the world, after the United States and the Russian
Federation). In 1991 its nuclear arsenal consisted of 220 strategic missile
carriers with about 1900 strategic nuclear warheads and 2500 tactical
nuclear weapons, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles: 130 SS-19
and 46 SS-24 (totally 1240 warheads), 25 Tu-95 and 19 Tu-160 strategic
bombers, capable of carrying cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.
The main striking power of Ukraine’s nuclear capability is 46 solid-fuel
intercontinental ballistic missiles SS-24 with ten warheads each - a short
range of more than 10,000 kilometers (Hay-Nizhnyk, 2017).
On October 24, 1991, Ukraine adopted a resolution of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine on its nuclear-free status. All nuclear charges were to be
dismantled and exported to Russia, strategic bombers and missile silos were
to be destroyed. In return, the Russian Federation and the U.S. provided
guarantees of the independence and integrity of Ukrainian territory (Pravo
Tech, 1994).
On June 23, 1992 the presidents of Russia B. Yeltsin and Ukraine L.
Kravchuk signed in Dagomys an agreement “On the Further Development of
Interstate Relations” (Ministry of foreign aairs of the Russian Federation,
1998), which stated that “the parties will build their relations as friendly
states” (Art. 1). They “rearm their commitment to the principle of open
borders between them” (Art. 8) and “cooperate in preventing and settling
conicts that could harm their security” (Art. 10).
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They also agreed to continue consultations “on the fulllment of their
obligations under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Oensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the Lisbon Protocol of May 23, 1992 and
the agreements previously made on the strategic nuclear forces of the
states” (Art. 11), and, respectively, on their mutual agreement to continue
negotiations” on the establishment on the basis of the Russian and
Ukrainian navies in the Black Sea (p. 14) (Ministry of foreign aairs of the
Russian Federation, 1998).
At that time, the Russian Federation continued to make territorial claims
to Ukraine, in particular: Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation of May 21, 1992, No. 2809-1 “On Legal Assessment of the
Decisions of the RSFSR State Authorities on the Change of Status of Crimea
Adopted in 1954,” according to which the Resolution of the Presidium of
the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of February 5, 1954 “On Transfer of the Crimea
Region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR” was declared “void from the
moment of its adoption”.
In December 1992 the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian
Federation asked the RF Supreme Soviet to consider the issue of status
of Sevastopol, and on July 9, 1993 the RF Supreme Soviet adopted the
resolution “On Status of the City of Sevastopol” which granted federal
status to the city.
It was then that the Ukrainian Armed Forces were not without diculty
formed in the Crimea, as evidenced by the letter of the Crimean branch of
the Union of Ocers of Ukraine to the rst persons of the country from
August 13, 1992 Having analyzed the agreements between Ukraine and
Russia from June 23, 1992, June 17, 1993, April 15, 1994, June 9, 1995,
we can state the position of Ukraine in the issue of the Black Sea Fleet, in
particular on reducing the percentage of ships, vessels and boats belonging
to Ukraine (Hay-Nizhnyk, 2017).
The struggle for the eet, reected, among other things, in the “war of
presidential decrees”, brought both sides to the brink of an armed conict.
On April 5, 1992, Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk signed a decree “On
the transition of the Black Sea Fleet to administrative subordination to the
Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (Ministry of foreign aairs of the Russian
Federation, 1998). In response to this action, on April 7 of the same year,
the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin “On the
transition of the Black Sea Fleet under the jurisdiction of the Russian
Federation”.
The mutually exclusive decrees of the aforementioned top leaders led to
a physical confrontation between Ukrainian and Russian servicemen.
Tensions were reduced only after the heads of the governments of
Ukraine and Russia signed three agreements in Kiev in preparation for
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
the “Great Treaty” on friendship and cooperation, which provided for the
distribution of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and further separate basing of
Ukrainian and Russian warships. But on April 17, 2005 the third President
of Ukraine V. Yuschenko said that the status of the stationing of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Sevastopol and the adjacent territories
required an urgent review.
Another “sore point” in Ukrainian-Russian relations was the
determination of the status of the Kerch Strait, which is the only natural
exit from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. Bilateral negotiations on this
issue were dicult and tense. In December 2003, Presidents Putin and L.
Kuchma signed the “Treaty on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and
the Kerch Strait”. Parliaments of the two countries ratied the document
synchronously, in April 2004.
The document provided for free passage of merchant and military ships
of the two countries through the strait and free access to the ports of Russia
and Ukraine for foreign merchant ships.
However, this never happened. Experts explained that Russia did not
want to give Ukraine control over the Kerch-Yenikalsky Strait. At the same
time, Ukraine proceeded from the fact that the division should be based
solely on the administrative border line that existed during the Soviet
Union. And according to it, the canal is in the Ukrainian part of the strait.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea on March 21, 2014, the Russian
Federation unilaterally declared its territorial right to the Kerch Strait and
Tuzla Island, and in June of the same year it was decided to build a bridge
across the Kerch Strait and Tuzla Island.
On May 31, 1997 in Kiev Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma
signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine, which became the basic legal document
that was to determine the further development of their bilateral relations
(Agreement on friendship, 1999). It enshrined the principles of strategic
partnership, recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, respect for
territorial integrity and mutual obligation not to use their territory to the
detriment of each other’s security.
The Article 12 of the Agreement obliged both states to provide
“protection of ethnic, cultural, language and religious identity of national
minorities on their territories”, to reject attempts of forced assimilation of
national minorities, as well as to promote creation of “equal opportunities
and conditions for studying Russian language in Ukraine and Ukrainian
language in the Russian Federation. Duration of the Treaty - 10 years (to
2007).
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The end of the XX and beginning of the XXI century was aected by the
destruction of the common economic space of the former USSR and became
one of the main factors of the crisis state of the national economies of Russia
and Ukraine as a whole and of the oil and gas industry in particular.
In the winter of 1992-1993 a series of intergovernmental contacts took
place, as a result of which the technical credits were converted into Ukrainian
state debt and a plan for their repayment until 1999 was developed.
However, the situation escalated to such an extent that gas supplies to
Ukraine were restricted for several days. On August 11, 1992 L. Kuchma
met with Chernomyrdin, after which Russia resumed gas deliveries. But as
early as August 26, Russia announced another 25% cut of gas supplies to
Ukraine because of the increasing debt level in Ukraine.
However, the reduction in gas supplies proved to be an ineective
mechanism to ensure repayment of debts. In October 1993. Gazprom
oered to repay Ukraine’s debts through a long-term lease of a number of
facilities in the Ukrainian gas transmission system. The Ukrainian side,
however, was unwilling to accept the proposal, because it could have put the
country in an extremely dicult situation in the event of a new shutdown
of gas supply.
The passage through Ukrainian territory of all Russian main export
pipelines and the remoteness of the prospect of alternative routes allowed
Ukraine to advance its position on economic issues. In response to the
announcement of a gas supply cuto due to nonpayment for gas delivered
to Ukraine, the latter said that in such a case Ukraine would shut down the
transit pipelines that run through its territory. This situation became the
starting point for the development of an open “gas conict” between Russia
and Ukraine.
Counting on Ukraine’s accession to the agreement on forming a
common economic space (CES) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia and
joint cooperation in high-tech sectors and development of powerful long-
term projects, Russia on August 8, 2004 signed an additional agreement to
the contract between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogas, which set
a xed price for Russian gas at $50 for Ukraine until 2009. The agreement
stipulated a xed price of $50 per thousand cubic meters for Russian gas
(compared to an average European price of $160 to $170 at the time).
Simultaneously with the policy of open confrontation over the level of
prices for transit gas and the terms of the basing of the Russian eet, the
leadership of Ukraine intensied attempts to communicate with Euro-
Atlantic structures. All Ukrainian leaders of the post-Soviet period, from
Kravchuk to Zelensky, declared their intention to join them.
With the adoption of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in November 2002,
annual NATO-Ukraine Targeted Plans began to be developed. Thus, on
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
April 6, 2004, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on free access of NATO
forces to the territory of Ukraine. In April 2005, the military doctrine
included a thesis on strategic goal of Ukraine: “...Proceeding from the
fact that NATO and EU are guarantors of security and stability in Europe,
Ukraine is preparing for full membership in these organizations…” (Liga.
Zakon, 2005: n/p).
On January 23, 2005, Viktor Yushchenko became President of Ukraine.
His foreign policy, like that of his predecessors, envisioned European
integration and accession to Euro-Atlantic structures - NATO, rst and
foremost. A public relations campaign and a number of diplomatic measures
were implemented in this context. However, populism, lack of reforms, no
eective anti-corruption measures, and internal strife between the branches
of power in Ukraine had no chance to sign the Association Agreement
between Ukraine and the EU that year, nor to get the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) with the NATO.
Russian-Ukrainian interstate relations at that time were complicated
with a bitter aftertaste from the conict over the island of Kosa Tuzla,
which could only be resolved after the intervention of the presidents of
both countries (Russia suspended construction of a dam 180 meters from
the island and was forced to delay armed expansion against Ukraine for
decades) and increased geopolitical, energy, trade and economic, energy
problems and the like. Since 2008 there has been a signicant deterioration,
which was reected in the aggravation of the “gas war” and diplomatic
tensions related to the attempt to change Ukraine’s foreign policy course
from multi-vector to pro-Western.
At the same time, a joint statement “The Order of the New Century for
the Ukrainian-American Strategic Partnership” was signed in April 2005
following talks between V. Yushchenko and U.S. President J. Bush. In
his speech to the U.S. Congress, Yushchenko stated that the new Ukraine
shares Euro-Atlantic values, and therefore his country’s accession to the
EU and NATO “will strengthen stability throughout the region strategically
important to the United States, from Warsaw to Tbilisi to Baku” (Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine, 2011).
In August 2008 the Ministry of Foreign Aairs of Ukraine stated that
the Ukrainian side reserves the right under international law and Ukrainian
legislation to prohibit the return of ships and vessels of the Russian Black
Sea Fleet, which may take part in an armed conict in South Ossetia, to the
territory of Ukraine until the conict is resolved (Yushchenko, 2014).
In the international arena, the core theme of Ukrainian diplomacy has
also been the “Holodomor. Holodomor Remembrance Day was established
in Ukraine by decree of L. Kuchma in 1998, and V. Yushchenko in November
2006. Yushchenko signed the law “On the Holodomor of 1932-1933. In
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Ukraine, accusing Russia of deliberately “using genocide” against the
Ukrainian people. He also recognized Bandera and Shukhevich as ghters
for independence and awarded them the titles of Hero of Ukraine. Such
actions were very negatively received in Russia (Portnov, 2015; Yushchenko,
2014).
In the fall of 2008, after Russia threatened Ukraine with a trade war
during September bilateral trade negotiations, a series of mutual political
steps toward each other took place, which, however, turned out to be
diplomatically formal. Then it became clear that Ukraine would not be able
to get much closer to the EU and obtain a MAP for NATO membership
in the near future, and Russia somewhat stopped blackmailing Ukraine,
which gave the strange impression of improved relations between the two
countries.
At the beginning of January 2009, a second Russian-Ukrainian gas war
broke out and Russia stopped supplying natural gas to Europe altogether.
After Tymoshenko’s unilateral decision on the gas issue with Vladimir
Putin, on January 19, 2009 Naftogaz of Ukraine and Gazprom signed gas
contracts on gas purchase at USD 450 and transit rate of USD 1 7. This is
how Ukraine got a new gas contract with Russia, and passions between the
two states subsided for a while.
In late 2012 - early 2013, Russia proposed that Ukraine join the Customs
Union (CU) of the EurAsEC as a full member, arguing that it would benet
economically, in particular from the supply of Russian energy at lower
prices. However, so far there is a consensus among the Ukrainian elite
about the necessity of integration into the European Union and joining
the corresponding free trade zone. All Ukrainian parliamentary parties
(excluding the Communists) opposed Ukraine’s accession to the CU,
supporting the course of European integration.
In parallel with the gas diktat and blackmail, the Kremlin put forward
a number of geopolitical and military-political ones, such as: limiting
cooperation with the EU, preventing NATO from receiving MAPs,
preferences for its own goods in trade relations, “protection” of the Russian
language, strengthening its military beachhead in Crimea, etc.
Russia oered Kyiv full membership in the CU and was ready to provide
Ukraine with $15 billion in direct nancial aid, loans, and other preferences.
Ukraine was also promised a substantial reduction in the price of Russian
gas, which was to bring additional several billion dollars to its budget.
Besides, Russia oered some well-known Ukrainian businessmen to take
part in what they called “very protable projects” which should make the
business community nancially interested in rapprochement with Russia
rather than with the European Union.
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In this way, the Russian leadership forced Yanukovych to abandon the
course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and implement an anti-
Ukrainian humanitarian policy. The main goal was to return Ukraine to
the bosom of Russia forever, keeping it under the inuence of the Russian
Federation and destroying the Ukrainian identity. This meant russication
of Ukraine, which became part of the “Russian world” with no chance of
maintaining an independent, autonomous state.
Yanukovych and his government purposefully strengthened the Russian
military contingent in Crimea by their actions during 2010-2013. According
to the Kharkov agreements signed by him on April 24, 2010, the number
of Russian troops in Crimea was doubled, and FSB ocers were ocially
allowed to work there.
The next stage of the political confrontation and crisis in Ukrainian-
Russian relations was the events of 2013-2014. A week before the Eastern
Partnership summit in Vilnius (November 21, 2013), where Ukraine was
to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, Yanukovych
announced the suspension of preparations for the conclusion of this
agreement. This decision sparked a wave of protests in Kyiv and other
major Ukrainian cities. The forceful destruction of the opposition’s tent city
in the center of Kyiv on the night of November 30 radically strengthened
the anti-presidential nature of the protest action.
The main factors behind the protests were the high level of social
injustice, enormous polarization of incomes and living standards of
Ukrainian citizens, and rampant corruption that permeated all structural
components of Ukraine’s political system, including the judiciary and law
enforcement agencies. A detailed analysis of the economic and domestic
political situation in Ukraine during this period is given in the publications
(Azarov, 2015) and others (Allison, 2014; Raik, 2019).
After the dispersal of a peaceful rally of students and civic activists on
November 30, 2013, a spontaneous rally arose on Mykhailivska Square.
The leaders of the three opposition parties: V. Klitschko, Tyahnybok,
and Yatsenyuk announced a decision to establish a National Resistance
Headquarters. From the very beginning of the confrontation, the protesters
chose a course for peaceful protests.
Though, the attempt to draw the protesters into an aggressive
confrontation with the law enforcement forces during the storming of
the Presidential Administration on December 1 was unsuccessful: the
protesters did not join the storming, and opposition deputies and protest
leaders shielded the protesters from the law enforcement forces with their
bodies.
After the events of December 1, the power contact, although it took
place, but more and more passed into a civilized channel and had a local
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nature. At the same time, the authorities tried to imitate “popular support”
for the course of the government and the President by bringing people to
the “Anti-Maidan” - paid rallies held under the ags of the Party of Regions.
The events in Kyiv on February 18-20, 2014, were a dramatic phase of
the Revolution of Dignity, during which about a hundred protesters were
killed. On February 21, opposition leaders signed with Yanukovych an
Agreement on the Settlement of the Political Crisis in Ukraine. It provided
for a return to the 2004 constitution, i.e., a parliamentary-presidential
form of government, the formation of a “government of national trust”,
constitutional reform and early presidential elections by the end of that
year, as well as the withdrawal of law enforcement forces from downtown
Kiev, an end to violence, and the surrender of weapons by the opposition
(Kudelia, 2014).
But his signing was not welcomed by the people on the Maidan: the
demonstrators demanded that the president resign. On the morning of
February 22, Yanukovych ed Kiev. On 22 February, the Verkhovna Rada
upheld a resolution on Yanukovych’s self-removal from the presidency. On
23 February, Turchynov was appointed acting president.
Since the beginning of the next stage of confrontation and crisis between
Ukraine and Russia on February 27, 2014 to the conclusion of the Minsk
Protocol “on the cessation of the use of weapons” we will distinguish
3 stages: 1) forceful seizure by Russian special forces of the premises of
the Verkhovna Rada and the government of Crimea, holding a pseudo-
referendum on March 16, 2014 on the accession of the peninsula to the
Russian Federation and the incorporation of Crimea into Russia; 2) April
2014 - proclamation of the illegitimate “Donetsk People’s Republic” (April
7, 2014) and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (April 27, 2014), holding
bogus referendums during May on their separation from Ukraine; 3) August
27, 2014, when the mass invasion of the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions by regular units of the Russian Armed Forces, including those that
were part of the 9th Independent Motorized Rie Brigade, 76th and 98th
Airborne Division (Vasilenko, 2014: 31-32).
Let us briey review the main developments in all of these stages. On
February 23, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratied the law “On the
foundations of state language policy” of July 3, 2012, which, among other
things, guaranteed the ocial use of the so-called “regional languages”
on a par with the state language in Ukraine. This means languages which,
according to the population census, are considered native languages by
more than 10% of the population of the respective region.
Protests in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts turned into armed
confrontation, and the slogans of federalization of Ukraine changed to
demands for regional independence (Biersack and O’Lear, 2014; Kulyk,
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
2019; Matveeva, 2016; Nagashima, 2019; Richey, 2018; Ocial Statement,
2014; Zhukov, 2016).
In February and March 2014, the executive authorities of Sevastopol
and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the new Ukrainian government. Protests by the local, mostly
Russian-speaking population against the actions of the central authorities
to replace these authorities began. On March 1, Russian President V. Putin
submitted an appeal to the Federation Council “On the Use of Russian
Federation Troops in Ukraine” (Administration President of Russia, 2014;
Kuzio, 2015; Laruelle, 2016). On the same day, the Council of the Russian
Federation unanimously granted the president this authority.
On March 16, the new local authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol
organized and held a referendum, despite attempts of opposition from the
Ukrainian authorities and pressure from Western countries. The population
was asked to answer the question about the possibility of seceding from
Ukraine and becoming a part of Russia. On March 17, based on the results
of the referendum and the Declaration of Independence adopted on March
11, the sovereign Republic of Crimea was proclaimed, which included
Sevastopol as a city with a special status.
On March 18, 2014 in the Kremlin there was signed an agreement on
the admission of the Republic of Crimea to Russia. Russia explained its
position on the Crimean issue by protecting the local population and trying
to bring peace and harmony to this land (Newsti, 2014).
In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the European Union, and the United States enacted the provisions
of the rst set of sanctions against Russia. These measures were aimed at
freezing various assets, imposing visa restrictions for the persons included
in the special lists, and at the same time prohibiting the business entities of
the states that had joined the sanctions to continue maintaining business
and other relations with the individuals and enterprises included in these
lists.
In addition to such restrictions, avoidance of contacts and cooperation
with the Russian Federation and Russian enterprises and organizations
regardless of the sphere of cooperation was also initiated.
About events in the east of Ukraine, then under the pretext of holding
“referendums” there in April 2014 and to support illegal territorial
formations, Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups, paramilitary
formations of Russian Cossacks, manned by Chechens - citizens of the
Russian Federation (battalion “Vostok”), armed groups of mercenaries
“Russian sector” and “Oplot” were exiled to the territory of Ukraine. It was
with their participation that administrative buildings in many populated
areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were raided, and attacks were carried
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out against Ukrainian Ground Forces units and Ukrainian Air Force aircraft.
On April 17, 2014, quadrilateral negotiations on de-escalation of the
conict in Ukraine were held in Geneva with participation of the highest
diplomatic representatives of Ukraine, the EU, the USA and Russia.
Subsequently, Russia joined the talks in the Normandy Quartet format,
during which the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis was discussed. An
important step in this format was the meeting of the leaders of Russia,
France, Germany and Ukraine in Minsk on February 11-12, 2015.
The rst is a set of actions aimed at implementing the Minsk agreements
to resolve the situation in eastern Ukraine. In addition to the actual cessation
of shelling and the disengagement by both sides of all heavy weapons from
50 to 140 kilometers to form a security zone. Another document was the
Declaration on Supporting the Package of Measures for the Implementation
of the Minsk Agreements, adopted by the Normandy quartet leaders.
However, the signing of the February 12, 2015, Minsk documents did
not stop the ghting or the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. It is
possible that they were the result of behind-the-scenes agreements between
the top leadership of Ukraine, Russia, and leading Western countries.
According to the UN, from April 2014 to July 2016 alone, more than
10,000 people were killed and more than 23,000 injured in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions (BBC News, 2019; Coupé and Obrizan, 2016; Malyarenko
and Wol, 2018; Sotiriou, 2016; Stebelsky, 2018; Wilson, 2016).
As a follow-up to the above, research (Shcherbak, 2016) on thoughts
about the further development of interstate events is interesting, which
carries a certain degree of sensitivity and doubt, which is conrmed by
the number of respondents (Ukrainian and Polish citizens) who hesitate
in choosing a particular scenario of developments in relations between
Ukraine and Russia, with almost a third of foreigners
3. Discussion
Feeling a loss of control over Ukraine, Putin turned to armed aggression.
This is how Russia’s armed attack on Ukraine should be qualied, despite
the fact that for a certain period the Russian Federation used its armed
forces covertly. Its main purpose was to test the readiness and ability of
Western democracies to resist the forceful methods of implementation of
Russia’s revanchist plans.
Signicant socio-economic problems in Russia and Ukraine, the corrupt
nature of government, and the growing social divide have led to an increase
in destructive thinking, under the inuence of which there have been calls
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
for the destruction of the existing order of things to one degree or another.
In this situation the ideology of the “Russian world” turned out to be one of
the most signicant in the Russian socio-political space.
The identity crisis, as well as the acute stage of Russian nationalism,
will remain a knotty problem of ethno-political processes in the post-Soviet
space in the future. It will be the basis of Russian-Ukrainian relations
for decades to come, and, given the borderline nature of the territory of
Ukraine, of world political processes as well.
As the Russian opposition politician G. Kasparov notes, the idea of the
“Russian world” has become too ephemeral, it has not captured anyone, it
is an attempt to maintain a state of manic delirium in society.
In the opinion of the Ukrainian political publicist and journalist
V. Portnikov “Ukraine wants to ward o this very thing that destroys
everything, inhuman discord - the essence” of the Russian world “and
the Moscow Patriarchate” (Portnikov, 2015), and Tomenko notes that the
“Russian world” is not just harmful to national interests, it eliminates the
very meaning of the existence of the Ukrainian state (Tomenko, 2011).
Analysis of recent events shows that the aggravation of social
confrontation occurs mainly through the cultural decay of society, which
leads to the archaization of mass consciousness, creating conditions that
cast society into a state of social and cultural archaicism.
It is urgent to create a modern research structure that would
systematically study and analyze the current dynamics of doctrines like the
“Russian world”. Because this is a matter of national security and the key to
further development.
Thus, Russia’s inability to recognize Ukraine as a full-edged
international actor not so much on the legal as on the substantive level,
the desire to restore and consolidate relations according to the scheme
“center-periphery” forms a negative attitude to rapprochement with
Russia, conditioning its perception as an existential threat to international
subjectivity of Ukraine.
At the same time, maintaining a certain distance in relations with
Russia, which would guarantee Ukraine the preservation of its political
sovereignty, lies at the core of its foreign policy identity and determines
the process of further formation and lling with concrete “social” content,
relying on the political formula “Ukraine is not Russia”. It is this aspect of
Ukrainian-Russian relations that can be considered a certain constant of
intersection of all its key issues in the process of formation of the foreign
and domestic political agenda of Ukraine’s identity, as well as the point of.
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Conclusion
The events in Ukraine not only provoked the strongest confrontation
between the two largest states of the post-Soviet space, but also exposed a
number of problems in the entire international security system.
The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated a signicant political divide
between Russia and the West. It became a kind of marker of how great the
dierences are in the perception of nation-building, territorial problems,
the search for integration models, regional and global leadership, and the
distribution of responsibilities of the leading actors in international politics.
A fundamentally new page was opened in the contradictions between
Russia, on the one hand, and the United States, NATO and the European
Union, on the other.
The armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was
accompanied by numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
competent state authorities should calculate the amount of material and
moral damage caused by Russia.
Under the temporary occupation of two southern regions of Ukraine,
Russia is pursuing a policy aimed at destroying the Ukrainian common
civic identity, marginalizing and gradually replacing the ethnic Ukrainian
identity with the Russian identity. Now Ukraine has established the
Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of
Ukraine, which ensures formation and implementation of the state policy
on the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
and AR Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as adjacent territories.
Instead, Ukraine, its authorities need to develop a national
comprehensive strategy for the liberation of the occupied territories, which
would include socio-economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, informational,
as well as military components and should have several possible forecasts
(both positive and negative) of the development and consequences of future
events.
In particular, it is necessary to continue to implement Ukraine’s
international agreements on the implementation of democratic standards
in the context of the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU,
especially in the context of overcoming corruption and improving the
material well-being of Ukrainian; develop and adopt appropriate regulatory
documents aimed at the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories
(Donbass and Crimea) to counter the ideas of the “Russian world” to create
their own national information project “Great Ukraine”, “Ukrainian World”,
etc.), aimed at consolidation of Ukrainian society; prepare and implement
eective state programs for the integration of refugees from the east of
Ukraine and Crimea into Ukrainian society; conduct a wide information
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Events in eastern and southern Ukraine in retrospect of post-soviet relations
and educational campaign to popularize Ukrainian history, in particular
the history and culture of the southeastern regions of Ukraine, including
Crimea, among all categories of the population.
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