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The struggle for power during the reign of Sultan Mahmoud bin Mohammad bins Malikshah Seljuk (511-525 A.H. / 1117-1130 A.D.)

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Abstract

Modern studies have been concerned with the great Seljuk sultans and devoted many works and studies to address its crucial aspects. The current study attempts to shed light on the internal conflicts between members of the Seljuk family in the Sultanate of Mahmoud bin Mohammad, and the major transformations that took place giving that he occupied the Sultanate throne where the sultan who was sitting on the throne of Iraq and Persia was the only sultan in the state. Nevertheless, this matter has changed after the arrival of Sultan Mahmoud bin Mohammed to the Sultanate, and therefore, studying his reign and the internal conditions during it constructs the basis for understanding the development of the Seljuk Sultanate in particular and the system of the Sultanate in general.

Keywords: Mahmoud bin Mohammad al-Seljuqi, the Seljuqs, the Sultanate of Iraq, internal conflicts.

La lucha por el poder durante el reinado del sultán Mahmoud bin Mohammad bin Malikshah Seljuk (511- 525 A.H. / 1117-1130 A.D.)

Resumen

Los estudios modernos se han ocupado de los grandes sultanes selyúcidas y han dedicado muchas obras y estudios a abordar sus aspectos cruciales. El presente estudio intenta arrojar luz sobre los conflictos internos entre los miembros de la familia Seljuk en el Sultanato de Mahmoud bin Mohammad, y las grandes transformaciones que tuvieron lugar al ocupar el trono del Sultanato donde el sultán que estaba sentado en el trono de Irak y Persia era el único sultán del estado. Sin embargo, este asunto ha cambiado después

de la llegada del sultán Mahmoud bin Mohammed al Sultanato y, por lo tanto, el estudio de su reinado y las condiciones internas durante el mismo sienta las bases para comprender el desarrollo del Sultanato selyúcida en particular y el sistema del Sultanato en general.

Palabras clave: Mahmoud bin Mohammad al-Seljuqi, los selyúcidas, el sultanato de Irak, conflictos internos.

1. INTRODUCTION

This research paper aims at addressing the conflict that took place between the members of the Seljuk family over the position of the Sultanate during the reign of Sultan Mahmoud bin Muhammad Tabar during the period 511-525 AH / 1117-1130 AD, which is a continuation of the conflict around the Sultanate's throne and reaching it between the Sultan's sons and his brothers and the parties that contributed to stoking it. The conflict that erupted during the reign of Sultan Mahmud was marked by the emergence of fundamental changes in the structure of the rule of the Seljuk state that overturned the balances of governance and administration in the Seljuk state; hence, the Sultan of Khorasan became the greatest sultan after he was a follower of the Sultan of Iraq, and the Sultanate of Iraq headed by Sultan Mahmoud on behalf of his uncle Sultan Sanjar the Great Sultan came into power, besides taking up the position of the Abbasid Caliphate of this conflict and trying to benefit from it in regaining its stolen position from it.

The study attempts to answer multiple questions that include:
(1) Explain the circumstances that led to the emergence of what is known as the Sultanate of Iraq, to come into existence in the Seljuk

state ; (2) Explaining the factors that contributed to the arrival of Sultan Singer to the leadership of the Seljuk state and his making Khorasan the center of administration and governance and the axis of leadership in the Seljuk state ; (3) Address the role of the entourage, including ministers, military princes, and a veil in controlling Sultan Mahmud and stoking the spirit of the conflict between him and his uncle, Sultan Singer ; and (4) revealing whether or not the Abbasid Caliphate seized the opportunity of the internal conflict and tried to benefit from it to regain its role in the face of the increasing influence of the Seljuks and their increasing political and military role.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study adopted historical method based on collecting information from its original contemporary sources and events related to the focus of the study, linking it, analyzing and interpreting it to reach the results. Based on secondary sources, primary sources and material evidence, evaluating their relative authority appropriately in order to construct an accurate and reliable picture of past events and environments.

3. RESULTS and DISCUSSION

3.1. Sultan Mahmoud, his ancestry, birth, and upbringing

He is Abu Al-Qasim Mahmoud bin Mohammed bin Melkashshah bin Alb Arsalan bin Dawood bin Michael bin Seljuq bin Daqmaq, whose nickname was Moghayth Al-Din Al-Salgoughi. His mother, Kohr Khatun, was born in (498 A.H/ 1104 A.D.) Regarding his death date that most resources have agreed upon, it was mentioned that he died in (525 A.H./1104 A.D.) while being 28 years old (Ibn al-Amrani,1982; Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Husseini, 1984; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn Al-Atheer, 2012; Ibn Khilikan, 1997; Ibn al-Abri, 1997; Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Katheer, 1987; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghri 1963; Al-Emad Al-Hanbali, 1991). The eldest son of Sultan Mahmoud took over the Sultanate after the death of his father, Sultan Muhammad Bin Malkshah, in (511 A.H./1117 A.D.). Ibn Al-Amrani mentioned that his father, Sultan Mohammad Bin Malkshah, appointed his son, Mahmoud, as the Crown Prince in (508 A.H/ 1114 A.D.) (Ibn al-Amrani. 1982). Consequently, this has approved that Sultan Mohammad bin Malkshah wanted to prepare his son during his life to be his successor in the throne of the Sultanate as the oldest son. This comes as evidenced by the knowledge that Mahmoud had as he mastered the Arabic language and memorized poetry and maxims. He was also conversant with history. This was a pre-emptive step in the presence of King Sanjar, who has been based in Khorasan since the days of his brother Sultan Burkar. He extends his authority over large areas beyond the river, and over Ghazna and its works (Alfarqi, 1959; Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012). He is the most prominent member of the Seljuq family, after his brother, Sultan Bin Malkshah (Al-Bandari, 1980; Al-Husseini, 1984).

3.2. Taking over the Sultanate

Sultan Mahmoud conquered the Sultanate of Iraq in the capital Isfahan on the 24th of Dhu al-Hijjah (511 A.H./1117 A.D.), on the day his father, Sultan Mohammed, gave the legacy of the Sultanate throne to him. Mohammad has given a commandment to his son to take care of justice and charity towards the people of the sultanate. He was more than fourteen years old at that time and he got addressed to the pulpits of Baghdad on Muharram in (512 A.H./ 1118 A.D.) (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Ibn Katheer, 1987; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghri, 1963; Al-Emad Al-Hanbali, 1991). With this, the ceremony of his appointment was completed with the approval of the Abbasid Caliph, AlMostathher Billah, who died on the sixteenth of the spring of the same year (512 A.H./1118 A.D.) (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Bandari, 1980). Thus, Sultan Mahmoud has become the Sultan of the Seljuq State, considering that the Sultan of Iraq is considered as the only sultan by the Seljuqs as the first Seljuqs, from the reign of Tughrul, the Founder (Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Khilikan, 1997; Ibn Katheer, 1987).

King Sanjar was living in Khurasan when the news of the death of his brother Sultan Mohammed and his son, Sultan Mahmoud, sitting in his position on the throne of the Sultanate reached him. He showed sadness and dismay, closed the country for seven days, and ordered the preachers to mention the advantages of fighting insides and avoiding fees (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). After he received the consolations, he decided to move towards Iraq and Bilad Aljabal

where the sultanate of his nephew. He was derived to do so for the following reasons:

First: King Sanjar is the dean of the Seljuq family and the elder member after his brother Sultan Mohammed, and sees himself as the rightful leader of the family. Nothing has more indication of this ambition than he took the title of 'Moez al-Din', the title of his father Malkshah, after the death of his brother, Sultan Mohammed, whose nickname was Nasir al-Din.

Second: The consideration of Sultan Mahmoud as a young member who has a novel experience as he was about 14 years old when he took over the Sultanate. Thus, his age lacked experience, knowledge, and know-how in the administration of state affairs.

Third: The fall of Sultan Mahmoud under the influence of Prince Ali Bar and his minister, Abi Qasim al-Ansabi al-Darkazini, since the beginning of Sultan Mahmoud's reign (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghri, 1963).

Fourth: The policy is taken by Sultan Mahmoud, under the guidance of Abu al-Qasim al-Darkazini has ignited the fire of sedition in the mind of the Prince Ali Bar. This has made him tighten the control over Sultan Mahmoud by linking the Sultan's Minister and AlMostawfi Bil Hajib, Ali Bar, and benefit from

the young age of the Sultan and the weakness of his experience. Besides, he has benefited from the outcomes of this policy such as the decision that revealed the infirmity and weakness of the reign of Mahmoud and his shallow experience which were represented as follows.

1- Opposing his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, and getting out to him in addition to writing Khan Samarkand in an attempt to ally with him against Sultan Sanjar has been ameliorated to Sultan Mahmoud (Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Dhahabi 1985; Al-Bandari, 1980).

2- The return of Prince Dubais Bin Sidka Al-Asadi to Iraq after he had lived with Sultan Mahmoud for 10 years in satisfaction with what he is doing. The sultan's deputies have been running the Hilla area and other related areas. The return came in exchange for bribes received by the Sultan's entourage.

3- The entourage has influenced Sultan Mahmoud and raised suspicions about his deputy in Baghdad, Bahrouz, and questioned his wealth (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghri, 1963).

4- Al-Durkzini issuing an arrest warrant for the worker of Persia who was present in Isfahan, and asking for money from him. Subsequently, this provoked the anger of the Prince of Persia, who declared disobedience and assaulted the Sultan's property

in Persia (Al-Husseini, 1984; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn Katheer, 1987; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghri, 1963).

5- The ill-treatment of the princes of Mazandaran and the princes of Shabnkariya, and the denunciation of the good relationship established with them by Sultan Mohammed Bin Melkshah, which was based on a strategic dimension. Their strong fortresses have made it difficult to take them down due to its guardianship. This policy has led them to be provoked and to return to trouble and conflict (Al-Bandari, 1980).

6- Dissipation of what was left by Sultan Mohammed Bin Melkashshah, who was considered the greatest Suljaq's sultans regarding wealth, and the division of it and the emptying of the treasury of gold, jewelry, money, horses, and livestock (Al-Bandari, 1980; Al-Husseini, 1984).

7- The division of the monarchs of Sultan Mahmoud bin Mohamed and expeling them from him so that they, the princes, can tighten their control over Sultan Mahmoud by sending them to remote areas.

8- The ending the siege of the Almoote Castle (Al-Husseini, 1984), the withdrawal of the forces after they nearly fell into the hands of the army of Sultan Mohammed Bin Melkshah, the aftermath of the collapse of the Nizari State forces, which was the center of the Almoote Castle (Farhad Daftary, 2016), and the

arrest of Prince Anoshtein, the prince of the Saljuqi Military due to the withdrawal because of losing weapons and supplies for the Ismailis which supported the Almoot and strengthened it (Ibn Al-Atheer, 2012; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

9- The appointment of Prince Qaraja AlSaqi a military governor after King Seljuq, brother of Sultan Mahmoud, and his succession to the land of Persia where Prince Caesar was the ruler. Afterward, he fled towards Sultan Sanjar in Khorasan and joined him (Al-Isfahani, 2019; Al-Bandari, 1980).

10- Sharing the small Mamluks and the maids possessed by the Sultan (Al-Isfahani, 2019; Al-Bandari, 1980).

11- The princes have dared to go against the Sultan and controlling him by their choices according to their desires and wishes. These powerful men paved the way for the control of the little Sultan Mahmoud by killing his mother, Kahar Khatun because they were certain that Sultan Mohammed had been blessed in his last moments. They stamped a letter by the unconscious Sultan that accuses Kuhar Khatun of poisoning and being responsible for his death. Afterward, they killed her for fear of not being able to control the Sultan Mahmoud in her presence (Al-Isfahani, 2019; Al-Bandari, 1980).

In addition to these practices and immature policies, the first attempts of disobedience were made against the obedience of Sultan

Mahmoud, which was led by his brother King Tughrul, who was residing in the Castle of Sarghan (Al-Hamwi, Shihab al-Din, 1979). His father, the Sultan, had been cut off by Sawah, Awah, and Zanjan. When Sultan Mahmoud conquered the Sultanate, he sent Kentgdi to be the military governor of his brother, King Tughrul. Nevertheless, Prince Kentgdi has provoked King Tughrul to go against his brother, Sultan Mahmoud, who tried to return his brother, King Tughrul, under his obedience by sending him to Sharaf Aldeen Anoshrowan bin Khaled, carrying antiques, 30,000 dinars, and an increase in his dismemberment, and asking him to come to him. But Prince Kentgdi responded that they are obedient to Sultan Mahmoud and are ready to repel any aggression that he appoints at.

Therefore, Sultan Mahmoud decided to go out in private to bring his brother, King Tughrul, and Kentgdi back to his obedience. However, the news spread to Kengdi, and he fled and hid, along with the king Tagrul, in the castle of Sarjahan. Whereas Sultan Mahmoud headed to Smyran because it is a warehouse of ammunition and money that may lead King Tughrul and Kentgdi to head for it. Nonetheless, they have lost their way as the Sultan has reached Smyran. The Sultan took over a total of 300,000 dinars, the money he had paid. Afterward, he proceeded to Array, while King Tughrul and Kentgdi went to Kanja and settled there.

In addition to these policies adopted by Sultan Mahmoud, which confirmed the weakness of his experience and the dominance of his Minister Ali Bar and Abul Qasim al-Darkazini in the affairs of the

state according to their wishes and desires. The issue of Sultan Sunjar's ambition and desire to undertake the leadership of the sultanate comes after the death of his brother, Sultan Mohammad Bin Melkshah, and the preservation and continuation of the legalistic Suljuqi heritage.

3.3. The confrontation between Sultan Mahmoud and his uncle Sultan Sunjar

The starting events took place in (513 A.H./1119 A.D.), with a pre-emptive move taken by Sultan Mahmoud by sending Sharaf AlDeen Anoshorwan Bin Khaled and King Tagayrir Bin Alizen to Sultan Sanjar, carrying gifts and artifacts, and offering that Sultan Mahmoud should give up Mazandaran and pay around 200,000 dinars every year (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). This offer confirms the control of Minister Abi Al-Qasim Al-Darkazini on Sultan Mahmoud and his attempt to buy time until the alliance with Khan Samarkand is complete to move against Sultan Sanjar (Al-Bandari, 1980; Al-Husseini, 1984). However, this offer did not find acceptance from Sultan Sanjar, who was confirmed by the weakness of his nephew and lack of experience and control of him by the Minister of Druze and the princes. Therefore, he approved to Anshorwan and King Taghayrik that, my nephew is still young and his Minister and Ali have their control over him (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012).

Sultan Sanjar decided to move in an attempt to resolve the matter militarily, and so, he hired Prince Aner on the front of his army. He went to Jorgan, while at the forefront of Sultan Mahmoud's military was the two princes, Isfahlaran Ali Bar, and Monkopros. The front lines of Sultan Mahmoud's military were moved towards Jorgan, and it was about 10 thousand soldiers. As they approached Sultan Sanjar's army, they didn't proceed with fighting, nevertheless, they purposefully talked to Prince Anir to remind him that Sultan Mohammad has made a commandment, before his death, that Sultan Sanjar should be the one in the lead as he will keep the Sultanate safe for his son Mahmoud.

He warned the Sultan Sanjar that they were the ones who took the initiative to reach the areas of Sultan Mahmoud and that they were fewer and weaker. This message has paid off, as Prince Anar withdrew from Jorgan while few of his soldiers were taken as hostages by the soldiers of Sultan Mahmoud (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). Sultan Mahmoud has then reached Arai and Prince Ali Bar telling him what has happened with Sultan Sanjar's army. Mankoibers was accompanying Sultan Mahmoud as he left Iraq with ten thousand soldiers, Dubaise's brother, Prince Mansour bin Sadqa, the Bakaji Princes, and his minister, Al-Rubib, who died in Hamazan. He was replaced by Abu Talib Al-Sammeri, who continued his march towards the Sultan Sanjar's soldiers until he met him near Sawa on (2nd Jumada Al-Awwal 1350). Sultan Mahmoud's soldiers have been higher in number when compared to Sultan Sanjar's soldiers, as they were 30,900 soldiers compared to 20,000 soldiers (Al-Bandari, 1980; Al-

Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Rawandi, 1960), respectively of Wen on Sultan Sanjar's military is a number; They number 30,900 weapons, and the Sultan Sanjar's military is 20,000. As the two armies fought, the victory was for the Sultan Mahmoud's military, at the beginning of the war, as the rightmost group of Sanjar's army has been defeated, several army fighters fled where most of their weapons were looted, and a large number of them were killed.

Nevertheless, Sultan Sanjar stood up against withdrawal and said (either victory or murder) and used the elephants that accompanied his army, which terrorized Mahmoud's army and horses. Afterward, Mahmoud's army got defeated and the victory became aligning Sultan Sanjar's army. Sultan Mahmoud's army began to regress, and Sanjar sent to his army, which initially got defeated, to tell them about their victory. The news reached Baghdad (Ibn al-Qalansi, 1983; Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Al-Yazdi, 1979) and the sermon of Sultan Mahmoud was interrupted, and another for Sultan Sanjar was delivered. It was Dubais bin Sidka who sent the Abbasid Caliph, AlMostarshid Billah in (512-529 A.H. / 1118-1135 A.D.) to announce Sultan Sanjar's sermon. After his defeat, Sultan Mahmoud headed to Sabhan accompanied by his Minister, Abu Talib Al-Samirami, Prince Ali Bin Omar, and Qaragah and he stayed there waiting for what will Mahmoud do after his defeat (Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Al-Bandari, 1980; Al-Yazdi, 1979; Shabaro, 1999).

Looking at the outcome of the battle between Sultan Mahmoud and his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, we notice:

First: The sources that mentioned the number of both armies had two discrete opinions, where the first is mentioned their numbers explicitly, by which, the number of the Sultan Mahmoud's army was thirty thousand, and the number of the Sultan Sinjar's army was twenty thousand (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). However, Sabat ibn Al-Jawzi exclusively mentioned a completely different number of Sultan Sinjar's army, as he mentioned that it was one hundred thousand, which seems exaggerated (Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996). The researcher has based his suspicion of the number of Sultan Sinjar's army on the events of the battle that had the victory in its beginning for Sultan Mahmoud's army. The soldiers of Sultan Mahmoud preceded with the battle that was in the hands of Sultan Sanjar's army and took control of it, in addition to what Ibn Al-Atheer said "The soldiers of Mahmoud underestimated his uncle's soldiers with their numbers, courage, and their many horses. When they met, the souls of the Khursanis was weakened, as they saw this army with such strength and abundance. Thus, the right and left troops of Sanjar's army were defeated, his friends were confused and got defeated. They did not blame anything, many of their weapons were taken away, and many got killed" (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012).

Sultan Sanjar resorted to a trick that turned the balance of the battle in his favor. He sought the help of the elephants, and when Kheyl Mahmoud's horses saw them, the horses escaped. Sanjar's army

attacked Mahmoud's army, defeating and killing a group of his princes (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

The second researcher mentioned the outcome of the battle without referring to the number of the two armies. He only mentioned the superiority of Sultan Sanjar's army count and determined the battle in his favor (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Husseini, 1984; Al-Yazdi, 1979; Shabaro, 1999).

Second: Sultan Mahmoud army's structure, whose leaders were opposing and contradictory in their perspectives and plans. Prince Isfahsalar Ali Bar and Monkopars were contradictory and never agreed on any notion. Also, the sudden death of Sultan Mahmoud's Minister, Alrabeb Abu Mansour, took place, and Kamal Almalik Alsimiri taking over his throne has also contributed to the situation. Nevertheless, Sultan Mahmoud's army was able to gain victory in its initial stage, which subsequently assures what the researcher has estimated regarding the number of the armies mentioned by Sabat ibn Aljawzi (Al-Husseini, 1984; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

After the battle was resolved militarily in favor of Sultan Sanjar, a new phase of the Seljuk state's history began, by which, Sanjar agreed with his nephew, Sultan Mahmoud (Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Yazdi, 1979; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). However, the sources differed in determining the one who took the initiative for this reconciliation. Some sources mentioned that Sultan Sanjar is the one

who took the initiative in sending his nephew to bring him in after he was defeated in the battle. Others mentioned that it was the military princes, who were with Sultan Mahmoud, the first to contact Sultan Sanjar to apologize for what Sultan Mahmoud did (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Bandari, 1980).

Thus, it can be stated that the victory of Sultan Sanjar in the battle that took place between him and his nephew Sultan Mahmoud, the return of the defeated soldiers from Sanjar army, and the bias of many military princes such as al-Baroski (Ibn al-Jawzi et al., 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibin Al-Futi, 1995), has made Sultan Sanjar the winner, technically. Also, he aimed at highlighting his desire to end Sultan Mahmoud's rebellion against his obedience to ensure the non-spread of more conflict and aggression around him. All these factors have made Sultan Sanjar hold a strong position, even though he took the initiative to contact his nephew because it is motivated by the feelings of mercy and the type of relationship that connects them. Sanjar's awareness of the young age and the naïve experience of his nephew have driven him to not leave the matter to the military princes and commanders to control Mahmoud. This is evident especially since some of them took the initiative to mediate with him do so, such as Abu al-Qasim al-Durzini, Prince Ali Bar's friend, who gave money to Sultan Sanjar's entourage to facilitate his access to him. So did Minister Kamal al-Sammerami, who wanted to lead the way between Sultan Sanjar and Sultan Mahmoud, as he advised Sultan Mahmoud saying: "This is your uncle who is in your father's position, and he has rights over you, and his disobedience is bad, and it is a sign of being

well-mannered to beg for his gratification; accordingly I should go to him to sign this peace contract and make him pleased in general” (Al-Husseini, 1984; Al-Bandari, 1980). Besides, Sultan Sanjar could kill his nephew, Mahmoud, on the battlefield, but he did not (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Bandari, 1980).

This initiative was motivated by making Minster Al-Sammeri get a good relationship with Sultan Sanjar and make AlDarkizeni and Prince Ali Bar, who were seeking this initiative, miss this opportunity. This is a sign of the fragility of Sultan Mahmoud's position, as both of the ambassadors were for Sultan Mahmoud and his followers, who have supported him in his war against his uncle, and these are closely acquainted with his capabilities and abilities. This issue can be looked at from another perspective, by which, Sultan Sanjar welcomed the two ambassadors despite their previous role in inciting Sultan Mahmoud against him. Thus, this shows the depth of his experience, his great knowledge, and his desire to fusion everyone in the crucible of the state.

When the Minister headed to Sultan Sanjar, he met Prince Ali Bar's representative and told him that he was confident of Sultan Sanjar's desire for reconciliation and forgiveness for his nephew, Sultan Mahmoud. He did not care about this incident and continued his march towards the Sultan to be the one responsible for the reconciliation. As he got there, he was greeted with a fancy welcoming and he delivered the intentions of Sultan Mahmoud to resolve the issue. Sultan Mahmoud had a meeting with his Minster Kanal AlMalik

Alsumairmi before he met Sultan Sanjar, and they have discussed the conditions that Sanjar set for him to forgive him. By Sultan Mahmoud coming to his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, along with Prince Ali Bar, his minister Aldurkizini, Sultan Mahmoud's minister, and Kamal Almalik Alsumairmi, the two were able to come to terms with the past. A new era in the history of the Seljuq State has paved the way for Sultan Sanjar to be in control of Khurasan. Iraq has appeared as the following state after it being the center of the Seljuqs. It became later a state for Khursan's Sultanate and it was called the Sultanate of Iraq. This was evident in the conditions laid down by Sultan Sanjar to his nephew, Sultan Mahmoud, which Al-Rawandey and Albandari mentioned in details as follows:

First: Sultan Mahmoud should leave the paintings of the Sultanate out of respect for his uncle Sultan Sanjar.

Second: It is Sultan Sanjar who decides how long Mahmoud will spend in his hospitality.

Third: Sultan Mahmoud is not allowed to have a ride in the presence of his uncle Sultan Sanjar.

Fourth: Sultan Mahmoud is not allowed to dwell in his red tent but in a black and white tent.

Fifth: Drums should not smite for Sultan Mahmoud, as long as he is in the presence of Sultan Sanjar.

Sixth: Sultan Mahmouds need to kiss the ground when his uncle Sultan Sanjar enters, to stay standing as he comes, and to walk with him as his passenger.

Seventh: Sultan Mahmoud needs to live near his uncle's tent with his children and his wife, to not be alone in a private tent, and he shall remain in this condition for twenty days (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Bandari, 1980; Shabaro, 1999).

Looking at these conditions, it can be noticed that Sultan Sanjar assured the signs of subordination to him after he stripped Sultan Mahmoud of the Sultanate's ceremonies. This is a form of punishment for the rebellion and disobedience shown by Sultan Mahmoud. Also, it is a sign of the end of the old era in which the Iraqi authorities ruled the Seljuq State, which was transferred to the Sultan of Khorasan, Sultan Sanjar, who became the greatest Sultan. This became apparent as Sultan Sanjar formed a government without giving any role to Sultan Mahmoud. He issued a declaration appointing Kamal Al-Malik Al-Sammermi as a Minister, a decree to empower Prince Ali Bar to the position of an Emir, an appointing of Abi Al-Qasim Al-Darkazini as Minister for promotion and construction, in addition to having Shaml Almalik bin Nitham in the Office of Referendum (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Husseini, 1984; Al-Bandari, 1980). These steps can be read in more than one perspective:

First-Political perspective: It was attested in the stripping of Sultan Mahmoud of all the aspects of being a sultan and the imposition

of isolation on him for approximately a month. After its expiry, a decision was issued to appoint him as the Sultan of Iraq and to reinstate the stripped features of the sultanate. This is an affirmation by Sultan Sanjar of his right to issue and retrieve titles whenever he wants. This is a very important development, as for the first time, we have two powers: Greater, Sanjar, and made great, Mahmoud, which is a new arrangement that has never been attested before in the history of Seljuq, which is, at the same time, a confession from Sanjar of Mahmoud's power despite his defeat and mismanagement of his entourage. He accepted the share of the sultanate with him, albeit Mahmoud having less control for the fear of his eventual rebellion that could return the sultanate to Mahmoud because of his strong motives. Therefore, Sanjar accepted the marriage of his daughter and Mahmoud and declared him a crown prince for the Great Sultanate and the rule of Iraq (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Bandari, 1980).

Second- Management perspective: The management perspective was depicted in the formation of Sultan Sanjar's administration of Iraq, which consists of the Minister and the heads of the Diwans and issuing a declaration appointing them to their designated roles during the stay of Sultan Mahmoud. This indicates the creation of a direct connection between the members of the administration with himself as he was the one appointing them to their roles. Thus, he has the right to appoint and isolate them as he is the greatest Sultan.

Third- Economic perspective: It was represented by Sultan Sanjar sending his workers to the cities of Iraq to take taxes. Therefore, and with this action, he completes the tightening of control over Sultan Mahmoud and makes his authority stripped of its parts (Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Bandari, 1980).

Forth- Geographical perspective: It was demonstrated in the geographical area that remained under the administration of Sultan Mahmoud, as Sultan Sanjar took over Alrai, Mazandaran, Tabarstan, Qomos, Damgan, Duband and added them to his authority, as well as what was allocated to his brother Rokn al-Din Tughrul Bin Mohammad, including the areas of Sawah, Abha, Sark, Saman, Qazvin, and Ibhar.

As for his brother, King Seljuq, he had the whole state of Persia and a half of Isfahan from the Khuz. Dubais bin Sidka controlled Basra and its relations, in addition to Al-Bataih and the rest of Iraq, such as Heet, Al-Anbar, Euphrates, Al-Rahba, and Ana. The control of the relations of Mosul, Nasibin, and Al-Khabour was in the hands of other princes. These divisions revealed the extent of the limited geographical area remaining for Sultan Mahmoud, and the consequent contraction of the lands of the Sultanate of Iraq belonging to him (Ibn al-Amrani, 1982; Al-Rawandi, 1960; Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Bandari, 1980). According to this, it can be said that Sultan Sanjar has tightened his grip on Sultan Mahmoud, who has become a member of the Sultan of Khorasan's group. Since then, Sultan Sanjar has been named the Great Sultan of the Sultans, while Sultan Mahmoud is the

Master of Sultans. Yazdi has mentioned the change that was happening upon the Sultanate of Iraq, where he said that Sultan Sanjar designated the Government of Iraq for Sultan Mahmoud (Al-Yazdi, 1979; Al-Rawandi, 1960).

Sultan Sanjar sought to deepen his relationship with his nephew, Sultan Mahmoud. So, he has arranged a marriage for his daughter, Mahmalak Khatun, and Mahmoud. This marriage falls under the door of political intermarriage, by which the Sultan completes his control over his nephew and ensures that he stays under his brigade. He also appointed him as Crown Prince on the throne of Khorasan (Al-Yazdi, 1979; Ibn al-Qalansi, 1983).

3.4. Internal conflicts in the Sultanate of Iraq

The first rebellion- King Masoud bin Mohammed Tabar

After Sultan Mahmoud was crowned as the Crown Prince of Sultan Sanjar, ruled over Iraq, and got addressed on the pulpits after his uncle Sanjar, his brother, King Massoud, rebelled against the Sultan in (514 A.H./1120 A.D.) which is considered the second rebellion. King Massoud has rebelled against the Sultan in (512 A.H./1118 A.D.) after the death of their father, Sultan Mohammad bin Malkshah. King Saud had supported Atabke, and Dubais bin Sidka has also rebelled, who claimed the house of his father, which was in the

Palace Mosque in Baghdad. Moreover, Aqsanqar Albarsiqi who was planning to seize Iraq without resorting to the Sultan's order. Sultan Mahmoud has faced disobedience that is constituted by seeking political and economic purposes due to the presence of a Sultan who is young taking over control of the Sultanate, which meant seizing the opportunities (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). The danger has increased with the arrival of King Massoud and Atabaic Bey's armies to the Kingdom House in Baghdad, and the accession of Aqsanqar Al-Barsiqi to them, after Sultan Mahmoud appointed him as the successor to Bahroz, who was removed by the Sultan's princes being against him as a result of his high position. Such an event demonstrates their extent of control over Sultan Mahmoud and his decisions (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

This rebellion took place in the year (513 A.H./1119 A.D.), following the death of Sultan Mohammed Bin Malkshah. King Tughrul was living in the Castle of Sarghan and has a feudal structure consisting of Sawah, Awah, and Zanjan. He is sponsored and managed by Atabak Anoshtekin Shirkir, who was able to multiply the feudal of King Tughrul through his remarkable activities in fighting Ismailia and extracting a number of their castles, such as Kolam Castle and Albaira Castle. He almost took over Almoote Castle if it wasn't for Sultan Mahmoud's decision that ordered the withdrawal based on the slander of Minister Durzikini, who suggested the replacement of Shirkir with Prince Kintighdi to preclude Shirkir from the Sultan by making him an Atabak for King Tughrul. When Kentgdi Zain arrived at the King, he dethroned his brother, Sultan Mahmoud, who had preferred to present

a diplomatic solution instead. He has sent Ashraf Al-Din Anoshrowan who was loaded with presents, antiques, and 30,000 dinars, promising to increase the division in return for Tughrul visiting him. It seems that he was a shameless man who was arrested and placed under his direct supervision. But the response came from Prince Kentgdi saying that “We are in obedience to the Sultan, and any party he orders to attack, we attack with our soldiers, whom we resist those whom he draws with his intention” (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

The response shows Kentgdi’s refusal to accept Sultan Mahmoud's offer because he understood what the Sultan wanted, along with Tughrul's military might, to which Kentgdi has alluded to in his response. Correspondingly, Sultan Mahmoud headed to the military solution, so he decided to move quickly and secretly, accompanied by ten thousand horsemen, towards the Samiraan Castle. The news spread to Prince Kentgdi through one of the boys, so he took King Tughrul with him in disguise and decided to head towards Sarghan Castle. In this way, their safety has been assured by Sultan Mahmoud and his military forces, who decided to go to the Samiraan Castle, where King Tughrul's money, earnings, and ammunition were kept. When Sultan Mahmoud arrived, he stole what he found in it, which is estimated at 300,000 dinars. He then headed to Zanjan and then settled there until he moved to Arrai. On the other hand, King Tughrul headed towards Kanja and his friends surrounded him. The relationship between King Tughrul and his brother, Sultan Mahmoud, has become more complicated (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun). However, the threat posed by King Tughrul has removed from the Sultanate of Mahmoud

the measures that he took and has ensured that the Mohammadia-Seljuki family was united behind him. Nevertheless, the danger posed by King Tughrul didn't last on Mahmoud's Sultanate due to the procedures he took including the unity of the Suljuq Almohamadi family. This, however, did not last long because the brothers of Sultan Mahmoud were very young and the Atabakas were controlling their decisions.

3.5. The second rebellion of King Masoud in (514 A.H./1120 A.D.)

This rebellion was caused by the departure of King Masoud, who had AMosul and Azerbaijan, from his brother Sultan Mahmoud. The reasons for this conflict, and the key players who were the reason behind starting the war between the brothers, must be stated as follows:

First: The role enacted by Dubais bin Sidka's and his correspondence with the armies of Atabak, King Massoud urge him to overthrow Sultan Mahmoud and ask for the Sultanate to be controlled by King Massoud. Dubais's goal was to create a conflict between the brothers, to achieve what his father achieved by creating aggression between Sultan Burkarak and his brother Sultan Mohammed in (493-497 A.H./ 1099-1103 A.D.).

Second: The ambitions and desires of the armies of King Saud's Atabak, who was calling the King of Morocco for the expansion of his kingdom, which included Mosul, Al-Sham, and Diyar Bakr (Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). He had planned to dethrone Sultan Mahmoud and prepare for King Masoud to take over, and the consequent expansion of his powers and influence on King Masoud and his administrative decisions. He appointed Abi Ismael Alasbahani as his minister, who had an agreement with the armies of Bik about dethroning Sultan Mahmoud and putting King Masoud in charge instead (Al-Husseini, 1984; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012). This is an indication of the agreement between them in terms of purpose and intention. Sultan Mahmoud tried to intimidate them, but they refused, and they addressed King Masoud for the Sultanate. As he marched to meet them at the Asadaba of the Sultan, the fighting took place, and King Masoud's army was defeated, and the number of ministers, like Abu Isamel, and soldiers were held captive. King Masoud fled to a mountain about twelve miles away to hide in it. He was sent to Sultan Mahmoud asking for safety and Sultan Mahmoud sent to him Al-Barsuki, who was carrying a letter of safety and asked him to come. When Al-Barsuki arrived at King Masoud's place, he found it empty as a result of the escape of the King with a group of princes who suggested going to Mosul, which was of his feudal along with Azerbaijani. Al-Barsuki traced him and found him thirty miles away. Al-Barsuki informed King Masoud of Sultan Mahmoud's amnesty and assured him what he wanted. King Masoud returned to Sultan Mahmoud who welcomed him. The period spent by King Masoud addressing himself in the Sultanate of Azerbaijan,

Mosul, and Al-Jazeera has been estimated with only twenty-eight days (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

As for the allies of King Masoud, Albik's armies went to Mosul to collect money and marched to the Zab after he became hopeless regarding reaching King Masoud. After that, he decided to go to Sultan Mahmoud and met him in Hamazan where he was amnestied. On the other hand, Bin Sida marched to Baghdad and performed many plundering and looting acts and demonstrated his intrigue towards Mahmoud. Thus, Sultan Mahmoud decided to confront him, but he fled to Marden where Ialghazi is located and he planned to send his brother as a hostage to the Sultan and return to Hilla as a form of security (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

1. King Tughrul's obedience to his brother Sultan Mahmoud

King Tughrul had lived in Kanja since his first disobedience towards his brother, Sultan Mahmoud (13500 A.D.), accompanied by his Atabak, Kengdi, the primary instigator of his brother's disobedient. After his death, Prince Aqsenr Al-Ahmadili took over the management of the Attabiki and continued the incitement against Sultan Mahmoud. He was followed by Tughrul and was strolled to Maragha and passed through Ardabil. Ardabil refrained from them, so they went to Hormuz. The Sultan sent the Albik's armies to the Prince in Azerbaijan, and Maragha approached them to fight, but they marched to Khonj. They then sent Prince Sherkir, who was the Atabik of King

Tughrul during the life of his father, Sultan Mohammad. Prince Sherkeir marched ahead of them towards Abhar, but the Sultan has diminished their intent, as the prince sent Bik's armies. Consequently, they sent him to demonstrate their obedience, and he forgave them (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

3.6. Confrontation with Dubais

Al-Zakawi played a prominent role in easing the atmosphere between Sultan Mahmoud and Dubais Bin Sidka to end their dispute by agreeing to send Mansour Bin Sidqa, Dubais's brother, and his son as a hostage to the Sultan. This happened to ensure that Dubais does not return to stirring up unrest and strife and carrying out the looting and plundering that he used to do. The Abbasid Caliph added the asking of the Sultan to appoint Aqsanqar Al-Bardsqi as Al-shuhna to Iraq and Baghdad, so that he may be ready to face Dubais if he thinks of creating any act that would disturb the status of the Caliphate and the Sultanate. The Sultan has agreed and he made Aqsanqar and the mother of his brother, King Masoud, got married. It seemed that Dubais was waiting for the departure of the Sultan of Baghdad to return to his previous period of rebellion. Therefore, Caliph Aqsanqar has been sent to fight Dubais on the eastern side of Euphrates, and victory was in favor of Dubais.

Al-Buraqi was defeated and Dubais sent to the Caliph that he still obeying and condoned Al-Buraqi's capture for the Caliph. He

requested the imprisoning of the Caliph's Minister, Jalal Al-Din Abi Ali Bin Sidka and his house should be looted and that of his family and friends. The Caliph has done what Dubais has requested for and then dismissed his minister and replaced him with Abu Nasr Ahmed Ahmed bin Al-Nizam. With regards to the Sultan, and as he got informed with what Dubais has done, he issued an order of imprisoning his brother, Mansour, in Burjeen Castle. Dubais has handled this action by announcing his disobedience again. He wore black, cut his hair, went back to the looting scene, took over what the Caliph had in the Nahr AlMalik area, and exiled the people to Baghdad (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996). The Caliph's messenger has been sent to Dubais carrying a letter to him that said (... He said: You guaranteed me the destruction of Ibn Sadaqa, my enemy, and you didn't keep the faith. Instead, you mined him out of trouble to resourcefulness, and you visited Ibn Nitham Almalik without consulting me, and I asked you to remove the Bursuqi from Baghdad and to release my brother, Mansour, and you never answered me. I give you a five-day chance to obey and respond to my requests or I will be fighting you" (Ibn al-Amrani. 1982; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996).

This message clearly shows that the Dubais crossed all traditions and customs in addressing the Caliph to the extent that he sees himself as a partner of the caliphate and as a contributor to it. He believes that he must be satisfied with the choices made by its ministers and employees, in addition to the threatening and intimidating language the message included as it specified a certain

amount of time, during of which, the requests must be implemented, forgetting and ignoring the fact that all the Caliph asked for in the message was because of his constant transgressions and prejudices. The Caliph decided to take serious action to put an end to this rebellion, which has escalated over time. He declared a state of mobilization and opened the door for recruitment to the public. Both Suleiman Bin Maharsh and Qaraush Bin Musllim joined him. He called the princes and took the pledge to Al-Barski and Imad Al-Din Zanki, who led the Wasit Army, with honesty and morality in the fight against Dubais, who rushed to ask for forgiveness and pardon after he received the news of the Caliph and his departure to confront him with unprecedented persistence and preparedness.

The Caliph has confirmed the refusal to accept any excuse. The two armies met, and Dubais's army got defeated as many were killed. Dubais fled to Sham, joined the Europeans (Ibn al-Amrani. 1982; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996), and made them greedy for Aleppo. When they failed to enter Aleppo, he joined King Tughrul and started to greed him to march towards Iraq and conquer it from the hands of his brother, Sultan Mahmoud (Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn al-Amrani. 1982; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996). The King, Tughrul decided to accept and work by Dubais's plan and head towards Iraq. They went so far as to arrive at Daquqa. The news reached the Caliph, and he prepared himself and ordered the Al-shuhna of Iraq, Yarnqash Azzakawi, princes, and soldiers to support him. Order of the Al-shuhna of Iraq was being processed to support him. An army of 12,000 soldiers beside the people and men of Baghdad got

ready for this war. The agreement between Dubais and King Tughrul was to cross Diala and Tamara, cross the Al-Nahrawan Bridge, so Dubais can stay to keep the crossings secure, and Tughrul goes to Baghdad to take control. Based on this, Dubais marched and Tughrul was supposed to follow him. However, the plan has not succeeded because of King Tughrul's fever and the flood caused by rain and torrents. Additionally, Dubais was dependent on the goods that Tughrul will be supplying, and thus, this caused the starvation of him and the soldiers of his army. If he had not seized thirty camels loaded with food and clothes, that were initially sent from Baghdad to support the Caliph and the ones accompanying him, death would have been the only fate for them as all the surviving chances were diminished and as he ran out of what would be used to face the other army (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghridi).

The news had been conveyed to the Caliph, Almustarshid, that King Tughrul and Dubais had seized Baghdad, so he marched to them. When he oversaw Diala, Dubais and those with him were asleep waiting for the arrival of King Tughrul, who had a fever. When Dubais realized that there was no hope in any victory and that he was in the hands of the Caliph, he resorted to asking for forgiveness and pardon as usual. The Caliph almost inclined to grant him what he asked for, but for the intervention of Minister ibn Sidka, who didn't support that decision and rejected it. The Caliph decided to go to Baghdad and appointed his Minister to be in charge of Dubais and his situation. The Caliph has ordered the pursuit of the departure of Dubais and King Tughrul from Baghdad. Afterward, they marched towards Sultan

Sanjar and looted Hamazan and took money from Hamazan's families. Sultan Mahmoud tried to track them down, but he failed. They reached Sultan Sanjar and started complaining to him about the Caliph, Almostarshid, and Yanraqish al-Zakawi.

3.7. The tension in the relationship between the Caliph, Almostarshid, and Sultan Mahmoud in the (520 A.H./1126 A.D.)

The retinue usually has an important role in the making of events and policy-making by its proximity to the caliphs, powers, and authority at all levels. This is confirmed by considering the reasons for the dispute between the Caliph, Almostarshid, and Sultan Mahmoud. Consequently, more tension in the relationship between Yarnaqsh Azzakawi, Baghdad's Al-shuhna, who is considered one of the leading members of Sultan Mahmoud's security forces in Baghdad, and the Caliph's deputies. This led to the interference of the Caliph and him threatening al-Zakawi, who in turn went out to Sultan Mahmoud, complaining and warning from the rise of the Caliph's power following his victory over Dubais and its reflection on the status and position of the Sultan.

The Sultan has thought of this complaint very deeply and he was convinced by it, especially as it was issued by Al-shuhna, who has a security status, so he decided to march to Iraq. As the news got to the Caliph, Almostarshid, he sent the Sultan a letter with Alanbari requesting the delay of his coming to Iraq resorting to describing the

state of Iraq as weak and poor due to the war that took place with Dubais, and the resulting disruption of economic life, insecurity, and the escape of farmers. Nevertheless, this message had a reverse reaction to it as the Sultan found a confirmation that strengthens the complaint of al-Zakawi and reinforces his claims about the growth and development of the Caliph's power, which increased his determination to move towards Iraq. The Caliph decided to resort to several escalatory measures designed to prevent the Sultan's goals of coming to Iraq and the resulting costs the Caliphate could not bear. These measures were the following:

1- The departure of the Caliph, Almostarshid, and his family to the western side of Baghdad, based on the support he received from Baghdad and Iraq. Sultan Mahmoud asked him to return to his home, but he refused, on the condition that the Sultan should delay his arrival, but the Sultan has refused and marched to Iraq (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Ibn Taghridi)

2- The Caliph sent Afeef to protect Wassit from the Sultan's deputies, who sent Imad Al-Din Zanki from Basra. When the two teams met, Afeef's soldiers were defeated and a large number of them were imprisoned. feef survived due to his good terms with Imad Al-Din (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

3- The Caliph assembled the ships, closed the doors of the Caliphate, and appointed Ibn Sahib a guard over the House of the Caliphate (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

As for Sultan Mahmoud, he arrived in Baghdad on the 20th of Dhu al-Hijjah, entered the Bab al-Shamasya, and some of his soldiers entered the houses of the public, which caused a stir of people. Their complaints rose to Sultan Mahmoud, who ordered their departure. The Sultan continued his request to the Caliph for reconciliation but no avail. Few fights happened between the soldiers, and the people's complaints were more frequent, and the Caliph stepped out of the canopy (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

4- This step was taken by the Caliph after the entry of the Sultan's soldiers to Baghdad and their practices of looting. The Caliph has ordered to hit the trumpets, get the ships ready, set up the bridge so people can cross over it, and take out one thousand soldiers from the canopy. This took place as the Sultan's military was busy with looting, which led to the capture of a number of their princes, and the looting of the Minister's house and Aziz Al-Mustawfi (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). The Caliph crossed to the eastern side accompanied by 30,000 fighters from Baghdad and Al-Suad. Trenches had been dug at night which caused the soldiers of the Sultan to fail at breaking into Baghdad. The victory was

almost in the hands of the Caliph if it wasn't for the bias of Prince Abi al-Haija al-Kurdi, the owner of Erbil, alongside Sultan Mahmoud, who also followed a plan to confront the defense measures taken by the Caliph, which relied primarily on psychological warfare. He ordered the distribution of weapons to all those with him by land and sea and asked Imad Eddin Zanki to bring himself and bring ships from Basra with him, and to ship them with men. He asked the men to board the ships by sea and the knights by land, so they went out in a scene full of fear. The Sultan and the soldiers walked in to face of the Caliph and his army, the Caliph got misdemeanor in peace after the recitation of the messengers between them. The Caliph presented to the Sultan what has settled between them in terms of money, gifts, and weapons (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

3.8. Ending the crisis between the Caliph, Almostarshid, and Sultan Mahmoud

On the 10th of Rabi' al-Akher of the year (512 A.H.), Sultan Mahmoud left Baghdad after the dispute with the Caliph ended and peace and stability prevailed. Upon his arrival at Hamazan's base, his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, sent him a scolding of what happened between him and the Caliph. Sultan Sanjar sent an ambassador to the Caliph, Almostarshid, to apologize about what Sultan Mohammad, his nephew, did (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996). This measure by Sultan Sanjar

seems to have been for the sake of diplomacy only. This hypothesis can be supported by what ibn AlJuzi mentioned, as he said: (When the Almostarshid fought Tughrul bin Mohammad, Mahmoud was happy about it and wrote for the Caliph and said: I have known what you did for me, as I am your servant and I am coming to you). They have communicated through pledges and covenants that they will be against Sanjar and they will be marching to fight him and that Mahmoud will be the main power in the Sultanate. When Sanjar knew this, he sent to Mahmoud, saying: “You are my right hand, and the Caliph is determined to deceit both of us. If you both plan something against me, he will get rid of me first and then come back to you. Thus, do not pay attention to him knowing that I have no male child. I did not offend you and I killed whoever was the cause of our fight, I returned you to the Sultanate, made you my crown prince, and made you get married to my daughter. I see you as my son, and I see myself as your father, so don’t cross what your father tells you to do. After this, you must go to Baghdad with your soldiers, and you shall destroy the Minister of the Caliph ibn Sidka, kill the Kurds, and take over his place and all the travel equipment. He says: “I have to come, and I agreed to take out the Al-shuhna of Baghdad, Yarnaqish the servant, to Sultan Mahmoud complaining of the Caliph” (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996).

This script clearly and explicitly reveals the Sultan Sanjar's view of the Abbasid Caliph, Almostarshid, and his desire to keep him remain weak through the unity of the Seljuq. This is part of the Seljuq’s general view of the Caliph and his religious position, which represents legitimacy only, and the emptying of the Caliphate

Establishment of any political role it may play, in addition to monitoring the growth of its military power and its size by all means. It can also be noted that the letter of Sanjar holds much respect for his nephew, and this is linked to his understanding of the sensitivity of the situation and his attempt to avoid the success of the possibility of the Sultan Mahmoud's alliance with the Caliph, Almostarshid, and the danger he will pose to his status as the greatest Sultan of Seljuq. This also indicates what Sultan Mahmoud is waiting for in the coming days as he is the heir of the Seljuk throne because Sultan Sanjar did not have male children to assume the throne of the Sultanate. Also, this came to remind Mahmoud of Sanjar's forgiveness during Mahmoud's first disobedience after the death of his father, Sultan Mohammed, and of the affinity he had with his uncle, the Sultan, who made him get married to his daughters.

After his return to Hamazan, Sultan Mahmoud began a series of administrative and political changes, such as his dismissal of Minister Aba Al-Qasim on the charge of supporting Almostarshid as a result of the advice of his enemies, and the appointment of Sharaf Al-Din Anshrowan as his Minister who continued to work as a minister for nearly a year and was exempted from it (Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Bandari, 1980; Al-Rawandi, 1960).

Anoshrowan points to the reasons why he sought exemption from the ministry, which were directly related to the power of al-Shahhab Asaad al-Tagraei, al-Safi Abu al-Qassim al-Mustawfi, and al-Amir al-Hajeeb al-Kabeer, in addition to Sultan Qhraman, which

caused his powers to be limited and to be falling short of doing anything. So, he resorted to resigning, which was accepted. Al-Darkazini was appointed to his position, and Anosharwan returned to Baghdad, but he was not spared from the evils of Al-Durkzini, who took over his house at the Tigris River (Al-Bandari, 1980).

3.9. Sanjar moving toward Sultan Mahmoud

In the year (522 A.H.), Sultan Sanjar moved toward Alrai to ensure the truth of the claim of King Tughrul and Dubais bin Sidka, who ruminated his chest against his nephew, Sultan Mahmoud, on the pretext of his alliance with the Caliph, Amostarshid. Until the truth of the matter became clear to him, he reached Alrai, and from there, he called his nephew, who came to him. By this, the claim of Tughrul and Dubais has been diminished. Sultan Sanjar then has honored Mahmoud and went back to Khurasan taking with him both of his brothers, Tughrul and Massoud. He was entrusted with the guidance of Dubais and his return to his hometown of Hilla (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Khaldun, 1999). In Mahram in the year (523 A.H.), Sultan Mahmoud headed to Baghdad to repair the condition of Dubais with the Caliph. The Sultan intended to make him take over Mosul, but Atabak Zanki gave 100,000 dinars to the Sultan to keep it for him. Sultan Mahmoud gave Zanki what he wanted and changed his plan about Dubais (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Khaldun, 1999).

When the mission for which Sultan Mahmoud was assigned by his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, ended, he went his way back to Hamazan. There, death took away his wife, the daughter of Sultan Sanjar, who was entrusted with Dubais from her father. He went through a health problem, which made Dubais seize the opportunity as he went to Hilla taking with him Sultan Mahmoud's young son, whom he managed to get him in Hilla after he fled away from Behrouz. The news got to the Sultan, who asked the two princes, Alahmadili and Quzal, to bring Dubais to him. Prince Al-Ahmadili immediately headed from Hamazan towards Iraq, and the Almostarshid prepared an army to confront Dubais and take over Hilla. News spread that Sultan Mahmoud is preparing to come to Iraq, and so Dubais was facing a united attack from Sultan Mahmoud and the Caliph, Almostarshid. Therefore, he sent a letter to propitiate the Caliph and to show his readiness to pay money and give presents. He also sent the Sultan the same as he was sent to the Caliph, so he might win the favor to discourage them from confronting him. But the Sultan insisted on coming, as did the Caliph.

Dubais has the only choice to flee towards the wilderness. He was arrested by Hassan Bin Maktum, Alkalbi from Damascus, whom Zanki bought for 50,000 dinars, and there was strong aggression between them. Zanki was expected to buy Dubais to treat him badly, but what happened was otherwise. He has honored him very well and he treated him greatly. During Sultan Mahmoud's stay in Baghdad, he received the news that his brother Masoud had gone out to ask for the Sultanate. He decided to return to Hamazan after the permission of the

Caliph, Almostarshid, who tried to dissuade him for fear of the return of Dubais. He addressed him saying: “You know what is between me and you in the pledge and the promise, and I do not go out with the military. If you leave then the enemy will come back and the King of Hilla, and you may renew what you know. He said to him: Whenever I leave Iraq and you find a movement from him, and feared for you and Muslims, and a matter was renewed for me with my brother, and I could not come, I will be breaking the pledge between us, and do whatever you find beneficial”.

This script reveals the Caliph’s action of relying on the support he received from Sultan Mahmoud in his defense of Baghdad against Dubais Bin Sidqa to such an extent that he linked Mahmoud's return to Hamazan to the return of Dubis to Baghdad. It also shows that Sultan Mahmoud has left the Caliph in a useless position if he gets defeated by his brother Masoud, which assures the awareness of Sultan Mahmoud regarding the legitimacy given to the Sultan who is supported by the greatest Sultan, Sultan Sanjar. As if Sultan Mahmoud sensed that King Masoud doesn’t have the power to demand the Sultanate without the consent of his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, especially as he was staying with him.

When Sultan Mahmoud arrived at Hamazan, he ended the disobedience of his brother, King Masoud, and they reconciled. Mahmoud gave him 100,000 dinars and left, and assigned for him the city of Kanja and its relations (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012).

3.10. The death of Sultan Mahmoud

Sultan Mahmoud fell ill in (525 A.H.) and died in Shawwal of the same year at the age of 27. Sabat ibn Aljawzi narrated a story version about his son, Dawoud, who took his place in the Sultanate, wondering:

Was this the work of his father, Sultan Mahmoud (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996), and that he disagreed with the Caliph, Almostarshid, who refused to pledge allegiance to him, except with the permission and approval of Sultan Sanjar. The Caliph responded to his request for a pledge to his son and money: (I don't have money, and it's all in the hands of Sanjar, he is the Sultan). He was determined to go to Baghdad and change the Caliph, and many messengers were sent to him from Hamazan, but he underestimated them and said: I'm the Sultan, and who's Sanjar?! The notables of the princes were arrested and the people of Hamazan were looted and treated with injustice, arbitrariness, and he was determined to go to Baghdad and change the Caliph, but death attacked him before he could finish his goal (Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996).

In this version, there is a perspective for more than one reason:

First: Since Sultan Mahmoud sat on the throne of the Sultanate of Iraq with the consent of his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, he never entered into any dispute with him and there was no conflict between them. On the contrary, relations have been good and have been crowned with marriages, twice.

Second: Sultan Mahmoud knows the strength of his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, and this makes him not embark on any such risk. He knows very well that Dawoud's son will not sit on the throne of the Sultanate without the consent of his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, and his support. In addition to the awareness of Sultan Mahmoud of the intentions of his brothers who tried to rebel against him many times.

Third: The speech between Sultan Mahmoud and the Caliph, Almostarshid, and their realization that each needs the other to defend Baghdad in front of Dubais, create a doubt that Mahmoud will ever take this step.

The other sources that were relied on by the current study said that Dawoud had sat on the throne of the Sultanate under the guidance of Minister Abi Qasim al-Ansabadi, who tried to get rid of several princes whom he deemed as dangerous by killing them, and they are Aziz Al-Din Abu Nasr Ahmed Bin Hamid Al-Mustafi, Anoshtekin, known as Shirir Bin Hajeb, and his son Omar, in addition to his alliance with Prince Aqasanqar Al-Ahmadili Atabek, his son Dawoud, and his declaration of his authority as the Sultan in the regions of Al-Jabal and Azerbaijan (Ibn al-Jawzi, 1996; Ibn Al-Atheer 2012; Al-Bandari, 1980; Ibn Khaldun, 1999; Al-Yazdi, 1979).

4. CONCLUSION

This study dealt with Sultan Mahmoud bin Mohammed Tubar Al-Salgouqi, him reaching the throne of the Sultanate of Iraq, his relationship with his uncle Sultan Sanjar, and the perspective of the Abbasid Caliphate designated by the Caliph, Almostarshid, regarding these aggressions between Sultan Mahmoud and his brothers over the throne of the Sultanate, and the role played by military princes and ministers in fanning and endorsing this conflict. The following results were concluded:

First: The assumption of power by Sultan Mahmoud after the death of his father, Sultan Mohammad, represented the actual beginning of so-called Sultanate of Iraq, whose emergence was connected to him taking over the throne in (511 A.H./ 1117 A.D.), and him getting into aggression with his uncle, Sultan Sanjar, and his obedience to him as he is the Greatest Sultan of the Great Seljuq State

Second: The victory of Sultan Sanjar over Sultan Mahmoud in (513 A.H/ 1119 A.D.) changed the map of governance in the Seljuq State. The Sultan of Iraq and Persia became under the control of the Sultan of Khorasan after the Sultanate of Iraq being the head of the Seljuq State. It became the rear defense line after Khorasan was representing this line.

Third: The age factor and Sanjar's taking over the state of Khurasan played a significant role in leading the Seljuq dynasty, whose sole leader, Sinjar, became unrivaled in the absence of anyone competing for this leadership from the sons of Malkshah bin Alb Arslan.

Fourth: The submission of Sultan Mahmoud bin Mohamed to his courtier represented by his minister and the military princes, and their tightening of control over him, by them getting rid of his mother and killing her with a letter that has been attributed to his father, Sultan Mohammed, during his illness in which he died. This was to ensure that they are alone in managing their

affairs, benefit from his young age, and his weak administrative and political experience.

Fifth: The tension between the sons of Sultan Mohammed Tubar, Mahmoud, Masoud, and Tughrul, in the period that has been tackled by the study, to which the military princes, ministers, and Atabiks contributed in its complexity, played a prominent role in weakening the position of the Sultan of Iraq before the Abbasid Caliphate, represented by Almostarshid. The Abbasid Caliphate tried to exploit this conflict to regain a part of its lost influence over the Seljuqs. It has also contributed to making the position of Sultan Mahmoud precarious because of these conflicts and their presence now and then.

Sixth: Sultan Sanjar gave extensive powers to his nephew, Sultan Mahmoud, to manage the affairs of the Sultanate of Iraq as a deputy to the Great Sultan, and he prepared him to become the greatest Sultan after him. This can be explained by the fact that Sultan Sanjar left no boys behind to inherit the throne of the Sultanate after him.

Seventh: The early death of Sultan Mahmoud in (525 A.H./1130 A.D.) resulted in his inability to establish a strong foothold in the administration of the state in a way that would enable him to regain the leadership of the Seljuq State that was lost to his uncle, Sultan Sanjar. This was evident as he pledged to his son, Dawoud, to be his successor after his death in taking

over the Sultanate of Iraq. Nevertheless, this pledge wasn't applicable as he, Dawoud, has many opponents like the Greatest Sultan, Sanjar, and his brothers.

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