Revista de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales. FEC-LUZ
Ethics, which is defined as the good habit of the subject, since there
is no subject in this digital world as we know it, as expressed in the previous
lines, but rather a fluidity of subjects, is characterized in another dimension,
whose ontic frameworks also remain to be defined. Some philosophers, such
as the aforementioned Han (2022), prefer to say that it disappears: in the
digital society there is no communicative reason. On the contrary, a digital
rationality is imposed. Let us leave the political aspects for another
opportunity.
These ideas serve to introduce us to the subject that concerns us in
this editorial. The question of whether or not communicative rationality
prevails in the digital world or whether it is bypassed by the so-called digital
rationality, as Byung Cul Han calls it. To ask about this communicative
rationality could be considered a meaningless question. It would not be
possible to think that human beings, that species that prevails in the world
precisely because it is endowed with speech, and thus with a communicative
power through reason, do not possess precisely this power of
communication derived from reason, since our sense of being is not only
shaped by logos, which, in the words of Heraclitus, and which is later taken
by Aristotle, makes being as such a rational being; that is, as a being endowed
with communicative power through logos that makes us human.
Communicative rationality, precisely because of the ontic and ethical
characteristics described above, is based on the idea of communication
(Habermas, 1999). This principle of identity present in reason points to the
idea of argumentation; that is, the question of convincing the participant in
the communicative dialogue that is engaged in, that the reasons, put forward
with good arguments, indeed, with the pretension that they are the best, can
be accepted as valid in order, consequently, to make the decisions that derive
from the statements that conform it. For this same reason, communicative
rationality demands ethical rules during the very process of arguing, from
which all communicative ethical theories (the aforementioned Habermas,
1999 and 1998; Cortina, 2010, etc.) are derived.
This is what Byung Chul Han (2022) points to. Communicative ethics
loses strength as a normative entity in the context of digital rationality. The
former demands arguments, while the latter imposes itself as a totality. And
this is the crux of the matter, as my teacher of Theory of Legal
Argumentation, the excellent professor José Ignacio Beltrán, would say,
almost forty years ago; or that other great of philosophical dissertation, who
was another great teacher and friend, Álvaro Márquez-Fernández. Digital
rationality finds itself in an environment in which ethics can be conspicuous
by its absence, if we lose the state of alertness that we must maintain in this
context of dilution of the entity; or of disappearance, in the traditional sense
of the term.