NOTAS Y DEBATES DE ACTUALIDAD

UTOPÍA Y PRAXIS LATINOAMERICANA. AÑO: 23, n° 82 (JULIO-SEPTIEMBRE), 2018, pp. 417-421 

REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFÍA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL

CESA-FCES-UNIVERSIDAD DEL ZULIA. MARACAIBO-VENEZUELA. 

ISSN 1315-5216 / ISSN-e: 2477-9555

 

New Solution of Psycho-physiological Problem


Nueva solución de un problema psico-fisiológico

 

Israel V. M. DATSKOVSKY

ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1176-085X

israel@moriah.co.il

Clinic of Psychodiagnostics and Pathopsychology, Beit Shemesh, Israel

 

Vitalii I. BOCHELIUK

Department of Psychology, Zaporizhia National Technical University, Zaporizhia, Ukraine

 

Azamat K. NAGYMZHANOV

Astana Medical University, Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan

 

Shynar M. TUREBAYEVA

Department of Foreign Philology, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan

 

Valentyna V. NECHYPORENKO

Department of Special Pedagogy and Special Psychology, Khortytsya National Training and Rehabilitation Academy, Zaporizhia, Ukraine

 

Olena L. POZDNYAKOVA

Department of Special Pedagogy and Special Psychology, Khortytsya National Training and Rehabilitation Academy, Khortytsya Island, Zaporizhia, Ukraine

 

This paper is filed in Zenodo:

DOI: http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1513222

 

ABSTRACT

 

Three currently known versions of the formulation of a psycho-physiological problem are presented in the introduction. In the second part of the article, facts, known for today, which contradicted at least one of the accepted statements of the psycho-physiological problem were considered, and the sum of these facts contradicts all three initial versions of the statement of this problem. In the third, main part of the article, with respect to already existing, a different view of author on a possible solution of a psycho-physiological problem is given.

 

 

Keywords: Psycho-physiological identity; psycho-physiological interaction; psycho-physiological parallelism; psycho-physiological problem.

 

RESUMEN

 

En la introducción se presentan tres versiones conocidas de la formulación de un problema psico-fisiológico. En la segunda parte del artículo, hechos, conocidos por hoy, que contradijeron por lo menos una de las declaraciones aceptadas del problema psico-fisiológico fueron consideradas, y la suma de estos hechos contradice las tres versiones iniciales de la declaración de este problema. En la tercera parte, principal del artículo, con respecto a lo ya existente, se ofrece una visión diferente de los autores sobre una posible solución de un problema psico-fisiológico.

 

Palabras clave: Identidad psico-fisiológica; interacción psico-fisiológica; paralelismo psico-fisiológico; problema psico-fisiológico.

 

 

Recibido: 28-07-2018 ● Aceptado: 07-09-2018

 


Utopía y Praxis Latinoamericana publishes under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0). For more information go to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed


INTRODUCTION

 

The psycho-physiological problem in its scientific sounding was first posed by Rene Descartes in the XVII century (Aleksandrov, 2014). In due course this problem began to be considered within the limits of one of three possible decisions (Zhdan, 2004). These variations of solutions today recognize psycho-physiological parallelism (coming directly from R. Descartes), psycho-physiological identity and psycho-physiological interaction (Gippenreiter, 2002).

Each of these principal directions today is represented by numerous theories and views, partially confirmedby experiments (Shvyrkov, 1978), but still leading only to palliative evidence of their verity and admitting, among them alternative interpretations of the results of experiments.

 

 

GENERAL CRITICISM OF BASIC APPROACHES TO SOLVING A PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL PROBLEM

 

Unfortunately, all three basic approaches to solving psycho-physiological problems, called scientific, today no longer meet the most important criterion of science character, which is that the hypothesis under consideration covers all currently known facts and become internally not contradictory.

Consider the facts, which, when fully considered all of them within the framework of each paradigm, give rise to the internal inconsistency of each of them.

The authors in (Datskovsky, 2018b) showed (following a series of publications by other authors) that the technical capabilities of the human brain for many orders are not enough of magnitude both for processing and storing those huge amounts of information that must "be" in the brain during the paradigm of identifying the mental and physiological (psycho-physiological identity). This is contrary to the paradigm of psycho-physiological identity.

The French sociologist and psychologist G. Le Bon (1995), at the end of the XIX century, showed that a person carries a lot of information from previous generations (not only from parents, but also from many generations, in fact, from everything that has been stably emerging over many years by generations of the people), which largely determines the mentality of a person regardless of the conditions of his upbringing in a different environment, fundamentally different from the social environment of the society in which his parents live, even if the child is raised in this different environment from an early age. G. Le Bon individualized this unconscious by way of a mental inheritance, received by an individual from the pyramid of direct relatives of the probands, which is expanding into the depths of generations. The volume of this information clearly does not fit into the genetic apparatus that is physically transferred from parents to a child and, at the same time, is a hidden force, in many respects influencing the views and behavior of an already grown up person. The initial availability of this initial information in a newly born child contradicts both the paradigm of psycho-physiological identity and the paradigm of psycho-physiological interaction.

Following the publication in 1976 of Raymond Moody’s book ‘Life after Death’ and the avalanche of similar publications that followed this book (which is still continuing today), it became impossible to deny the independent existence of the “soul” (we are not defined this concept here) outside the life of the material body. Although all data on this non-material (in the categories of primitive materialism) is obtained by the method of introspection, which in modern science is not considered the most reliable way to collect information, partially the authenticity in this information, which is at disposal of the “soul that separated from the body”, is checked by the knowledge of a person who came back to life after an unconscious state of clinical death (and not any unconscious state at all) about subjects that being in the room and which a person in principle could not see from the place, where he was located, and only from a higher point above the body, moreover with the freedom of movement around the room. This fact contradicts both the paradigm of psycho-physiological identity and the paradigm of psycho-physiological interaction (Moody, 2000).

Today we know, on the basis of the enormous amount of data, about the connection certain parts of the brain with certain mental phenomena, properties, manifestations (Shirochin, 2004). The destruction of certain fragments of the brain leads to a complete or partial loss of the corresponding mental function (sometimes partially restored with time due to the plasticity of the brain, due to the redistribution of the lost function between other fragments of the brain) (Yakhno and Shtulman, 2001). This cannot but contradict the idea of an independent existence of soul and body, that is, it does not fit into the Cartesian paradigm of psycho-physiological parallelism.

It is impossible to deny the presence and the huge role of ontogenesis. This removes the question (or requires additions in the explanations) about the presence of an existing soul before the birth of a child, which has previous experience and previously accumulated knowledge, which a born child receives in ready-made form. The unconditional presence of ontogenesis sharply contradicts the paradigm of psycho-physiological parallelism. 

So, it turned out that all three initial solutions to the psychophysiological problem when considering all the facts accumulated up to a given time turn out to be internally contradictory. 

Consequently, a way out of this situation can be found either on the path of constructing a fourth, which has no internal contradictions when covering all known facts of the paradigm, or on the path of constructing a complex paradigm from some combination of the existing ones. We will go the second way and try to offer a model that combines the paradigms of psycho-physiological interaction and psycho-physiological parallelism, completely rejecting the paradigm of psycho-physiological identity.

 

 

A POSSIBLE INTERNALLY NON-CONTRADICTORY SOLUTION TO A PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL PROBLEM

 

We postulate the construction of the "psyche – body" structure, consisting not of two, as usual, but of three components – an eternal and all-knowing soul created from it for the period of the life of the material organism of epidusha and the material brain that is in the organism existing during the period of its life in our material world, was given to us in sensations. All three structures are in sequential interaction – the soul contacts and interacts only with the epidusha, the epidusha just with the brain. At an early stage of development, the developing material organism receives again and exclusively for it a formed epidusha, clear from the accumulated knowledge, which is just beginning its ontogenesis (in the state of tabula rasa).

The human brain is, in fact, a computer that has only two functions – the entire set of sensitive capabilities and their primary organization (in connection with the corresponding receptors – sight, hearing, tactility, taste, etc., at the level of sensitivity. Sensation and perception are no longer in the brain, but in the epidusha) and by control systems of the body’s motor complex according to commands from the epidusha. In addition, the brain can exchange information with the epidusha – transmit sensations to it and receive control commands for the motor complex from it. In the brain, the programs of the simplest unconditioned reflexes (which can disappear with the destruction of that part of the brain where they are stitched) are also rigidly “stitched” (entered, fixed and permanently present). But it is possible that the programs of these simplest unconditioned reflexes are "in the epidusha without their withdrawal into consciousness and disappear (cannot manifest) upon the destruction of that part of the brain through which they are realized due to the disruption of the connection "transmitter" (epidusha) – "receiver" (the corresponding part of the brain that controls the execution of this reflex).

Even when performing unconditioned reflexes, information about deviations that require more complex (reasonable) actions is brought to the attention of consciousness, for example, unconditionally doing a quick pulling of his hand away from the fire, epidusha relatively slowly transmits information about the entire event into consciousness and especially about the pain.

The automatic control of internal organs (receiving information from them, constant analysis of the data obtained by given "stitched" programs and return of commands on functioning of the complex of internal organs) is carried out mainly by the autonomic nervous system with minimal inclusion of the lower (in relation to the cortex) parts of the brain (first of all, of the gate and cerebellum) (Voronova et al., 2005), but it is possible that and the programs for assessing the condition and control of internal organs (analyzing and controlling functions attributed to the autonomic nervous system) "stitched" in epidusha without output them into consciousness.

Information enters the consciousness only when there is a sharp deviation in the functioning of the internal organs, when the available programs bring to the attention the information about the deviation and about their inability to cope with the situation – pain, discomfort.

Everything that we refer to consciousness and higher mental activity is located in the epidusha (a “processor” that implements all these functions, is located there). There also situated a full, with a huge volume, the human memory, which is manifested in consciousness (through the "processor") only partially, with the realization of the function of forgetting and unexpected "floating" of parts of previously memorized, but forgotten information (Datskovsky, 2018). In this thought we rely on the opinion of W.G. Penfield, which we cite from the book by Oliver Saks (2017). Canadian neurosurgeon of American origin U.G. Based on the observations of patients, Penfield concluded that the brain saves an accurate record of all human experiences throughout his life (visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, emotions, mood, all the volume of thinking, etc.). The stream of human consciousness, considered by W.G. Penfield, is registred in full and can then be reproduced both in normal life circumstances, and as a result of epileptic or electrical stimulation (Saks, 2017).

Sometimes abnormalities in the brain affect the functioning of epidusha. For example, epileptic (natural or artificial) stimulation of some parts of the temporal lobe of the brain can cause reminiscences to consciousness from the full amount of memory stored in the epidusha, but hidden behind a veil of forgetting.

Subconsciousness, intuition, enormous intellectual capabilities, complete information about the previous and accumulating in this life of the experience, knowledge, skills are located in the soul, which can, as necessary (unclear how determining), transfer part of its information to epidusha and continuously receive from it the whole volume of accumulated experience.

Exactly the epidusha walk through the full process of ontogenesis known to us, in particular the process of developing thinking and learning, and is in contact with the brain in accordance with those parts of the brain that are designed and executed to transfer to the body a certain functions of the psyche. Accordingly, the epidusha receives sensations from the brain from the sensors in accordance with those parts of the brain that receive information from these sensors and transmit it to the epidusha. That is why at the destruction of a certain part of the brain epidusha loses the ability to implement a psyche function "associated" with this part of the brain – the "transmitter" (in the epidusha) exists, and the "receiver" (in the brain) collapsed. The opposite is also true - when a particular sensor (for example, an eye) dies, the “receiver” (in the epidusha) exists, the “transmitter” (in the brain) is healthy, but the information to the “transmitter” is not transmitted.

Or the “transmitter” (in the brain) can also be destroyed, and then the information from the sensor will also not reach to the “receiver” (in the epidusha). As is customary in computer science, it can be assumed that the transfer of information between the "receiver" and the "transmitter "(in both directions) is carried out with the active participation of the" processors "on both sides. 

At the time of death of the material brain the epidusha, transferring all the accumulated material into the soul (perhaps all the accumulated material is transferred from the epidusha to the soul not once, but constantly upon receipt) the epidusha or merges with the soul (possibly remaining in its structure as a separate block of information, for example, among other things, information about those realities of the historical period in which a person lived, whose brain was associated with this epidusha during his lifetime. Perhaps the soul may include a number of epidushas from different historical eras of our world) or whether ceases to exist.

Most likely, at the time of clinical death, in time of near-death experience, the person’s consciousness already goes to the soul, but then for some reason returns to the epidusha along with the “revitalization” of the body. It turns out that during the near-death experience, the soul or epidusha has a very short and temporary location in our material three-dimensional world with the possibility of limited movement over the body, namely, in the same region of space where the dying material body is located (above the body in the room, above body at the scene of a car accident, etc.).

The parts of souls A, B, and C described in (Datskovsky, 2018b) are wholly related to the structure, which in this text is called epidusha. Such a hypothesis, which is combining the paradigms of psycho-physiological interaction and psycho-physiological parallelism allows one to explain all the existing facts without internal contradictions, and does not resort to the need to include the paradigm of psycho-physiological identity directly contradicting this hypothesis. The paradigm of psycho-physiological parallelism in this hypothesis is realized by the soul, and the paradigm of psycho-physiological parallelism is realized by the epidusha (Datskovsky, 2018a).

 

CONCLUSION

 

A hypothesis for the construction and functioning of the "mind – body" structure, which is uniting the paradigms of psycho-physiological interaction and psycho-physiological parallelism, is proposed. This hypothesis combines all the facts known to date and at the same time is internally consistent.

From the proposed hypothesis of the construction and functioning of the "psyche – body" structure, it is rather clear follows the need of the conscious realization of the goal of life.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY REFERENCES

 

Aleksandrov, Yu.I. (2014). Psycho-physiology. Piter, Saint Petersburg.

 

Datskovsky, I. (2018a). Autologotherapy of the healthy, Electronic Scientific and Practical Journal "Psychology, Sociology and Pedagogy". 5. Retrieved June 28, 2018 from http://psychology.snauka.ru/2018/05/8572

 

Datskovsky, I. (2018b). Brain, thinking, memory, soul, Electronic scientific and practical journal "Psychology, Sociology and Pedagogy". 6. Retrieved June 28, 2018 from http://psychology.snauka.ru/2018/06/8603

 

Gippenreiter, Yu.B. (2002). Introduction to general psychology. CheRo, Yurayt, Moscow.

 

Le Bon, G. (1995). The psychology of peoples and the masses. Maket, Saint Petersburg.

 

Moody, R. (2000). Life after life. Put, Moscow.

 

Saks, O. (2017). The man who consider his wife as a hat. AST, Moscow.

 

Shirochin, V.P. (2004). Architectonics of thinking and the neuro-intelligence. Yunior, Kiev.

 

Shvyrkov, V.B. (1978). Neurophysiological study of systemic mechanisms of behavior. Nauka, Moscow.

 

Voronova, N.V., Klimova, H.M., Mendzheritsky, A.M. (2005). Anatomy of the central nervous system. Aspekt Press, Moscow.

 

Yakhno, N.N., Shtulman, D.R. (2001). Diseases of the nervous system. Meditsina, Moscow.

 

Zhdan, A.N. (2004). The history of psychology. From Antiquity to our days. Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, Moscow.